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Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity 
Margaret Z. Johns.∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
While certainly the vast majority of prosecutors are ethical lawyers 
engaged in vital public service, the undeniable fact is that many innocent 
people have been wrongly convicted of crimes as a result of 
prosecutorial misconduct.1 Prosecutors are rarely disciplined or 
criminally prosecuted for their misconduct,2 and the victims of this 
misconduct are generally denied any civil remedy because of 
prosecutorial immunities.3
In litigation under the major federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, two kinds of immunity apply to prosecutors: absolute immunity 
and qualified immunity. The immunity that applies depends on the 
 ∗ Senior Lecturer, University of California, School of Law, Davis; J.D., University of 
California, School of Law, Davis, 1976; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1970. Many 
thanks to my colleagues, Laura Batie, Alan Brownstein, Anupam Chander, Susan Christian, Lisa 
Pruitt, Jim Smith, Marty West, Carter White, and Tobias Wolff, for their suggestions and 
encouragement. I am indebted to my student, Andrew Whang, for volunteering to read an early draft 
and offering many helpful comments. I am grateful to Suzellen Darden, Rita Golden, Waleen Kostal, 
Pam Johnston, Ruth Morgan, and Carolyn Oltraver for their friendship and enthusiasm for this 
project. Most importantly, my thanks to my family, especially Frank, Bob, and Hope, for their love 
and support. 
 1. CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL 
PROSECUTORS 45–47, app. at 108–09 (2003) [hereinafter HARMFUL ERROR]; BARRY SCHECK ET AL., 
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY 
CONVICTED app. 2, at 263 (2000); Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death 
Penalty: What Went Wrong?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 423 (2001) (detailing rates of 
prosecutorial misconduct in Illinois); Kenneth Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: How 
Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To Win (pts. 1–5), CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10–14, 1999; Innocence Project, at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2004); James S. Liebman et al., A Broken 
System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995 (2000), at 
http://www.justice.policy.net/jpreport/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 42–65. 
 2. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 78–80; James S. Liebman, The Overproduction 
of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2121–24 (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 123–
31. 
 3. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 43–44; Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121; Lesley E. 
Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3453–63 (1999). 
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function the prosecutor was performing at the time of the misconduct.4 
When prosecutors act as advocates, absolute immunity applies.5 Under 
absolute immunity, prosecutors are immunized even when the plaintiff 
establishes that the prosecutor acted intentionally, in bad faith, and with 
malice.6 When prosecutors act as investigators or administrators, 
qualified immunity applies.7 Under qualified immunity, prosecutors are 
immunized unless the misconduct violated clearly established law of 
which a reasonable prosecutor would have known.8 This functional 
approach to prosecutorial immunity has created confusion and conflict in 
the lower courts.9 Together, these immunities deny civil remedies to 
innocent people who have been wrongly convicted of crimes as a result 
of prosecutorial misconduct. While qualified immunity strikes a balance 
between providing a remedy for egregious misconduct and protecting the 
honest prosecutor from liability,10 absolute immunity should be 
reconsidered. 
In adopting absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Supreme Court 
relied on historical understandings and contemporary policies.11 Both 
justifications are dubious. According to the Court’s interpretation of 
history, Congress intended to retain well-established common-law 
 4. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127–29 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 
268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). 
 5. Burns, 500 U.S. at 487–96 (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability 
for false statements in a probable cause hearing); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) 
(holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for using false testimony at trial); see 
also infra Parts III and IV. 
 6. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; see Williams, supra note 3, at 3457–61 
(collecting cases in which prosecutors received absolute immunity for inducing perjury, failing to 
disclose exculpatory evidence, fabricating evidence and presenting false testimony, improperly 
influencing witnesses, initiating a prosecution without probable cause, and breaching plea 
agreements). 
 7. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 122–23 (holding that a prosecutor who swore to false facts in an 
affidavit is entitled to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272–76 
(holding that a prosecutor who conspired with police to manufacture false evidence is entitled to 
qualified immunity, not absolute immunity); Burns, 500 U.S. at 492–96 (holding that a prosecutor 
receives qualified immunity for giving legal advice to the police); see Williams, supra note 3, at 
3461–63 (collecting cases in which prosecutors received qualified immunity for providing incorrect 
information in a search warrant, failing to protect witnesses at risk of violence, leaking false and 
defamatory information to the media, conducting illegal wiretaps, and participating in illegal 
searches and seizures). 
 8. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part V.B.5. 
 11. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123–29; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 267–71; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–87; 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–29. 
2JOH-FIN 5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM 
53] Prosecutorial Immunity 
 55 
 
immunities when it adopted § 1983 in 1871.12 But even assuming 
Congress intended to retain the existing common-law immunities, 
absolute prosecutorial immunity was not the established law in 1871.13 
In fact, the first case affording prosecutors absolute immunity was not 
decided until 1896.14 Congress could not have intended to retain this 
immunity when it adopted § 1983 because it simply did not exist at that 
time. Rather, in 1871 prosecutors would have been accorded qualified 
immunity, not absolute immunity.15 Thus, the historical argument for 
absolute prosecutorial immunity is unfounded. 
The policy reasons supporting absolute prosecutorial immunity are 
equally untenable. The Court has justified absolute prosecutorial 
immunity on the grounds that the threat of civil liability would 
undermine vigorous prosecutorial performance, constrain independent 
decisionmaking, and divert time and resources to defending frivolous 
litigation.16 In short, in the Court’s view, exposing prosecutors to civil 
liability would burden and undermine the functioning of the criminal 
justice system. 
But contrary to this policy argument, absolute immunity is not 
needed to prevent frivolous litigation or to protect the judicial process. 
Absolute immunity protects the dishonest prosecutor but is unnecessary 
to protect the honest prosecutor since the requirements for establishing a 
cause of action and the defense of qualified immunity will protect all but 
the most incompetent and willful wrongdoers.17 Specifically, under a 
qualified immunity regime, the victim of misconduct can only maintain 
an action by defeating the criminal charges18 and proving that the 
prosecutor violated clearly established constitutional law19 with a 
culpable state of mind.20 And the qualified immunity defense has been 
strengthened to provide a complete defense at the earliest stages of 
 12. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–18. 
 13. See infra Part V.A. 
 14. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896) (holding that a prosecutor is entitled to 
absolute immunity). 
 15. See infra Part V.A. 
 16. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124–25; Burns, 500 U.S. at 485–87; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423–29. See 
generally infra Part IV.A. 
 17. See infra Part V.B.5. 
 18. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 569–84. 
 19. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see infra Part V.B.5. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 590–600. 
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litigation for all but the most inexcusable misconduct.21 Thus, qualified 
immunity provides prosecutors sufficient protection to ensure that they 
perform their functions independently, without undue timidity or 
distraction.22 In short, in all cases qualified immunity for prosecutors 
would provide sufficient protection to the criminal justice system, while 
providing a necessary remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.23
In addition to protecting the dishonest prosecutor at the expense of 
the innocent victim, absolute immunity violates public policy for other 
reasons as well. Absolute immunity frustrates the purpose of civil rights 
legislation by failing to deter frequent and egregious misconduct.24 It 
also hinders the development of constitutional standards and the 
implementation of structural solutions for systemic problems.25 
Prosecutorial liability—with the safeguard of qualified immunity to 
prevent vexatious litigation—is necessary to ensure the integrity of the 
criminal justice system.26
Moreover, not only is the doctrine of absolute immunity unsupported 
by history and contrary to public policy, but its practical application is 
also unnecessarily confusing and unworkable.27 It has produced circuit 
splits on at least four distinct issues, which, surprisingly, have not been 
addressed in the scholarly commentary. First, the circuits are split on 
whether the criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when a 
prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely.28 Second, they are divided 
on whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when she 
fabricates evidence or coerces a witness to testify falsely and then uses 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 601–19. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 610–19. 
 23. See infra Part V.B. 
 24. See infra Part V.B.3. 
 25. See infra Part V.B.4. 
 26. See infra Part V.B. 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
 28. Compare Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the coercion 
of a witness does not violate a defendant’s right to due process), and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 
F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994) (same), with Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
the coercion of a witness violates a defendant’s due process rights). While the merits of the due 
process claim are distinct from the immunity defense, the operation of the absolute immunity 
defense produces this conflict because it resolves cases without reaching the merits of the dispute 
and thus impedes the resolution of the substantive issues. See generally infra Part IV.B.1 and Part 
V.B.4. 
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that tainted evidence in a judicial proceeding.29 Third, the circuit 
decisions have taken different approaches to the probable cause 
requirement for absolute immunity announced in Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons.30 Finally, they are split on how to determine whether a 
prosecutor is acting as an investigator or advocate when she engages in 
misconduct after probable cause has been met.31 In Justice Thomas’s 
opinion, the Court should review the current immunity law both to 
consider a remedy for egregious misconduct and also to resolve the 
current conflicts in the courts of appeals.32
The reconsideration of absolute prosecutorial immunity is especially 
urgent for two reasons: (1) recent empirical studies establish that 
prosecutorial misconduct is a significant factor contributing to numerous 
wrongful convictions of innocent people;33 and (2) emerging circuit 
splits on the application of the absolute prosecutorial immunity doctrine 
suggest that it is becoming increasingly unworkable and is in fact 
undermining the goals it was designed to achieve.34
First, a 2003 study presents alarming evidence of the frequency of 
prosecutorial misconduct resulting in the wrongful conviction of 
hundreds of innocent people.35 This conclusion is reinforced with the 
ongoing investigation by the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, which reported that, as of January 2005, 154 people who 
served time in prison for crimes they did not commit have been 
exonerated by DNA evidence.36 In many of these cases, prosecutorial 
 29. Compare Michaels, 222 F.3d 118 (holding that absolute immunity applies), with Milstein 
v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that qualified immunity applies), and Zahrey, 221 
F.3d 342 (same). See generally infra Part IV.B.2. 
 30. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). Compare Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 796–98 (6th Cir. 
2003) (applying absolute immunity despite absence of probable cause), Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 
189, 191–95 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same), Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 1993) (same), and 
Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661–62 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying absolute immunity where 
probable cause was based on coerced testimony), with Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 (applying qualified 
immunity where the finding of probable cause was based on false evidence). See generally infra Part 
IV.B.3. 
 31. Compare Hill, 45 F.3d at 662–63 (holding that whether a prosecutor is acting as an 
investigator or as an advocate depends on an objective analysis), with Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 
627, 633–36 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that whether a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or as an 
advocate depends on his or her subjective state of mind). See generally infra Part IV.B.4. 
 32. See Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 1119 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
 33. See infra Part II. 
 34. See infra Part IV.B.3 and 4. 
 35. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1. 
 36. Innocence Project, supra note 1. 
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misconduct contributed to the wrongful convictions.37 Based on these 
studies, one can no longer dismiss the problem of prosecutorial 
misconduct as infrequent nor pretend that sufficient safeguards exist in 
the system to protect the innocent from wrongful convictions. 
Second, the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity is proving 
increasingly problematic in the lower courts. Attempting to apply the 
current absolute immunity defense, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have 
recently applied a subjective standard to the determination of whether a 
prosecutor was acting as an advocate or an investigator.38 This standard 
requires extensive discovery into the details of the criminal investigation 
and creates questions of fact as to the prosecutor’s subjective state of 
mind, which cannot be readily resolved by pretrial motions.39 This 
approach effectively defeats the entire purpose for the immunity 
defenses, which is to protect officials not only from the burden of 
liability, but also from the burden of litigation.40 In other words, in these 
circuits—and in others that may follow their lead—the current immunity 
doctrine not only deprives the victim of a needed remedy, it also deprives 
honest prosecutors of the protection they deserve from burdensome and 
distracting litigation. 
This Article begins by outlining the significance of the problem of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity. Specifically, Part II discusses the 
frequency of prosecutorial misconduct and wrongful convictions and 
explains the inadequacy of current deterrents and corrective mechanisms. 
I begin with this exposition of the problem because in developing the 
absolute immunity doctrine the federal courts have not taken into account 
the vast and mounting evidence of frequent and unchecked prosecutorial 
misconduct resulting in the wrongful incarceration of many innocent 
people. Rather, courts confidently assert that civil liability is unnecessary 
because other mechanisms are sufficient to deter and correct 
prosecutorial misconduct.41 Absolute immunity would not be a serious 
 37. Id. 
 38. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110–12 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 
F.3d 1092, 1098–1100 (9th Cir. 2004); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); see infra Part IV.B.4. 
 39. KRL, 384 F.3d at 1110–12; Genzler, 384 F.3d at 1098–1100; Broam, 320 F.3d at 1033; 
Cousin, 325 F.3d at 633–35; see infra Part IV.B.4. 
 40. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–
18 (1982). 
 41. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522 (describing 
the legal system as a “self-correcting” process); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512–13 (1978); 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–29 (1976); Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 122 (3d 
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problem if prosecutors rarely engaged in misconduct, if corrective 
mechanisms were effective, and if innocent people were not wrongfully 
convicted. To the extent that the current absolute immunity doctrine is 
based on such mistaken assumptions, it is important to recognize the 
truth about prosecutorial misconduct. 
Part III provides a brief historical background of § 1983 liability and 
the immunity defenses. Part IV describes the current state of the law, 
beginning in Part IV.A with the Court’s current functional approach to 
prosecutorial immunity. Part IV.B details the current conflicts and 
confusion in the lower courts. Part V argues that absolute prosecutorial 
immunity should be abandoned and replaced in all circumstances by 
qualified immunity. Finally, Part VI presents a more modest proposal: 
even if absolute immunity were preserved for some core prosecutorial 
functions, it should not apply when the prosecutor has failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, nor should it be expanded to shield prosecutorial 
misconduct during the investigative phase. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Four recent, major studies have confirmed the frequency of 
prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct.42 All four concluded that 
significant numbers of innocent people have been convicted in part as a 
result of prosecutorial misconduct.43 Additionally, they all found that 
many innocent people have been sent to death row as a result of 
prosecutorial misconduct.44 Furthermore, all four concluded that 
prosecutors are neither criminally prosecuted nor disciplined for their 
misconduct.45 In light of these findings, one can no longer indulge in the 
comforting but false fantasy that our criminal justice system sufficiently 
protects the innocent from prosecutorial misconduct and ensuing 
wrongful convictions. 
Cir. 2000); Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Harm to a falsely-charged 
defendant is remedied by safeguards built into the judicial system—probable cause hearings, 
dismissal of the charges—and into the state codes of professional responsibility.”). 
 42. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1; James S. Liebman et al., 
Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000); Liebman, 
supra note 2; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1. 
 43. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2; Liebman, 
supra note 2, at 2094; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan. 10, 1999. 
 44. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 92–107; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xiv; 
Liebman, supra note 2, at 2094 n.160; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan 10, 1999. 
 45. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 78–90; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 175, 180–
81; Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121–22; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan. 10, 1999. 
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Specifically, in 2003 the Center for Public Integrity reported its 
finding that since 1970 there have been over 2000 cases in which 
prosecutorial misconduct by state and local prosecutors was sufficiently 
prejudicial to require charges to be dismissed, convictions to be reversed, 
or sentences to be reduced.46 In 513 additional cases, prosecutorial 
misconduct was discussed in dissenting and concurring opinions.47 And 
in thousands of other cases, appellate courts found prosecutorial 
misconduct but upheld the convictions under the harmless error 
standard.48 The report catalogued fifty-four cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct in which innocent people were convicted of serious crimes, 
including murder, rape, kidnapping, and robbery; in many of these cases, 
the innocent were sentenced to death.49 Yet, of the 2000 cases of 
prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors were disciplined in 
only forty-four cases and were never criminally prosecuted.50
In 2000, the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law at Yeshiva University published a major report on wrongful 
convictions. It revealed that as of August, 1999, DNA testing established 
“that 76 people had been sent to prison and death row for crimes they did 
not commit.”51 Prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in twenty-six 
percent of those cases.52 According to this ongoing project, as of January 
2005, 154 innocent people who served time in prison for crimes they did 
not commit have been exonerated by DNA evidence.53 Yet, like the 
Public Integrity study, the Innocence Project found that prosecutors were 
rarely held accountable for their misconduct.54
 46. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i, 2; id. app. at 108–09. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. app. at 92–107. Of these cases, one wrongful conviction occurred in the 1960s; twelve 
wrongful convictions occurred in the 1970s; thirty-one wrongful convictions occurred in the 1980s; 
and ten wrongful convictions occurred in the 1990s. The data from the 1990s to date is very 
preliminary given the length of time involved in capital prosecutions, appeals, and habeas 
proceedings. For example, in California it typically takes a decade for the direct appeal of a capital 
conviction to be resolved. Bob Egelko, State’s Chief Justice Praises Long Appeals Process, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 15, 2004, at A21. The subsequent state and federal habeas actions may last an 
additional five to ten years. Id. According to Professor Liebman, the average time for appellate and 
habeas review of a capital case is eleven years. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2056. 
 50. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 78–90. 
 51. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xiv. 
 52. Id. app. 2, at 263. 
 53. Innocence Project, supra note 1. 
 54. Id.; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 175, 180–181. 
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Two other national studies reached similar conclusions. A study 
published in 2000 by Professor James S. Liebman and his Columbia Law 
School colleagues examined 4578 state capital cases that were directly 
reviewed on appeal in state appellate courts and 599 capital cases that 
were reviewed in federal habeas corpus proceedings from 1973–95.55 
They concluded that sixty-eight percent of the cases contained serious 
error warranting reversal56 and catalogued numerous cases of 
prosecutorial misconduct.57 They too noted the lack of prosecutorial 
accountability.58
Similarly, a 1999 national study by the Chicago Tribune found that 
since 1963, 381 homicide convictions have been reversed for serious 
prosecutorial misconduct, including using false evidence or suppressing 
exculpatory evidence.59 Of the 381 defendants, sixty-seven had been 
sentenced to death.60 In describing the prosecutorial misconduct, the 
reporters wrote: “They have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the 
real killers were white. They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her 
husband committed suicide. They have prosecuted parents, hiding 
evidence their daughter was killed by wild dogs.”61 But, again, the study 
found prosecutors were neither prosecuted nor disciplined for their 
misconduct.62
State and local studies mirror the conclusions on a smaller scale. A 
report on Illinois death penalty cases found that prosecutorial misconduct 
accounted for twenty-one percent of all reversals.63 An Ohio study found 
that in fourteen of the forty-eight cases in which the death penalty was 
imposed some ethical issue involving the prosecutor had arisen.64 In 
California, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury reported that from 1979–
90, “The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office failed to fulfill 
the ethical responsibilities required of a public prosecutor by its 
 55. Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1844. 
 56. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2052–54; Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1850. 
 57. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2094–96 n.160; Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1850. 
 58. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121–22. 
 59. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan. 10, 1999. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Hartman & Richards, supra note 1, at 423. 
 64. Edward C. Brewer, III, Let’s Play Jeopardy: Where the Question Comes After the Answer 
for Stopping Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death-Penalty Cases, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 34, 36 (2001). 
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deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary to curtail 
the misuse of jail house informant testimony.”65
Unfortunately, these studies are but the latest of many reaching the 
same conclusion.66 For example, in 1932, Professor Edwin Borchard of 
Yale Law School published a book cataloguing sixty-five case studies of 
wrongful convictions, including eight cases in which defendants were 
convicted of murder but the alleged victim later turned out to be alive.67 
A 1987 Stanford study found that since 1900, 350 innocent people were 
convicted of potentially capital offenses.68 According to their analyses, 
fifty of those wrongful convictions resulted at least in part from 
prosecutorial misconduct, including suppression of exculpatory evidence 
(thirty-five cases) and overzealous prosecution (fifteen cases).69
As consistent and convincing as these studies are, numbers alone 
cannot convey the significance of the problem in human terms. For 
example, in recent years in North Carolina, five death sentences were 
reversed after prosecutorial misconduct was uncovered through the 
state’s open-files process, which applies to habeas corpus actions for 
prisoners on death row.70 In one case, the attorney general produced files 
that contained statements from seventeen witnesses who had seen the 
victim alive after the defendant was supposed to have killed him.71 In 
 65. REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY 6. The report catalogues inducements provided to informants in exchange for testimony. Id. 
at 76–90. It explains that informants were encouraged to fabricate information and evidence because 
they were never prosecuted for falsifying evidence, even though the fabrication was discovered. Id. 
at 90. For example, informants were not prosecuted even after they testified to “diametrically 
opposite facts in the same trial” and provided testimony that was “completely contrary to earlier 
taped statements.” Id. In other cases, informants were promised that their cooperation would be 
favorably reported if they provided “truthful” testimony. Id. at 95. As the Report observes, “[I]t is 
only reasonable that ‘truthful’ to the informant means consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the 
case. Otherwise, of course, there is no point in calling the informant as a witness.” Id. The Report 
explains that the District Attorney’s Office failed to take corrective measures although evidence of 
the abuses were known by the staff before it became publicly disclosed in a series of periodical 
articles in 1987. Id. at 97–111. And even after the public disclosure, the Report concludes that the 
management of the office failed to act in response to the abuses for more than a year. Id. at 111–22. 
 66. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 46–47. 
 67. Id. at 46 (summarizing EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE 
ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE). 
 68. Id. at 45–47; Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Redelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 23–24, apps. A–B (1987). 
 69. Bedau & Redelet, supra note 68, at 57. 
 70. Leonard Post, Open Files Key in Reversals: A Unique Discovery Statute Helps Death 
Row Inmates Win New Trial, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 4. 
 71. Id. 
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violation of the constitutional requirement established in Brady v. 
Maryland,72 the prosecutors had withheld the statements from the 
defendant’s trial and appellate counsel.73
Unfortunately, these are not isolated examples. An innocent Texas 
man served thirteen years on death row as a result of what a federal judge 
described as “outrageous” misconduct by the prosecutor, who failed to 
disclose evidence that overwhelmingly pointed to another man as the 
killer.74 In Louisiana, after fourteen years in prison, two innocent men 
convicted of the same crime walked off death row after their lawyers 
established serious prosecutorial misconduct.75 In California, two men 
were wrongfully convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison 
because prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence, including a 
confession by another man, an eyewitness’s corroboration, and an 
admission by a trial witness that she was lying about having seen the 
murder.76 In 2004 they were found factually innocent after serving more 
than thirteen years in prison.77 Another California man was convicted of 
murder and served twenty-four years before being released when a 
federal court determined that he had been wrongly convicted based on 
the testimony of a jailhouse informant, a heroin user with a lengthy 
criminal record.78 The prosecutors had struck a deal with the informant 
to obtain his testimony but failed to inform defense counsel of the deal.79 
In 1999, in Tulia, Texas, thirty-nine people—ten percent of the town’s 
black population—were arrested on drug charges.80 Thirty-five of them 
were convicted based on the false testimony of a former deputy sheriff 
 72. 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor must divulge potentially 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant). 
 73. Post, supra note 70, at 4. 
 74. Michael Yablonski, Section Volunteer Proves “Outrageous” Prosecutorial Misconduct 
in Murder Trial, LITIG. NEWS, June–July 1995, at 1, 8. 
 75. Sara Rimer, Two Death-Row Inmates Exonerated in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2001, 
at A8. One of the men, Mr. Burrell, “who is retarded and cannot read or write, came within 17 days 
of execution in 1996.” Id. 
 76. Bob Egelko, In Prison 13 Years for Murder, Freed Man Sues the City, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 
14, 2004, at A21; Bob Egelko, Wrongfully Convicted of Murder, Man Sues, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 28, 
2004, at B4; Joan Ryan, Innocent Man Freed with Luck, Good Lawyers, S.F. CHRON., May 5, 2004, 
at B1. 
 77. Egelko, supra note 76. 
 78. Judge Dismisses Murder Case, Frees Man After 24 Years, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2004, at 
B2. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Leonard Post, Trouble in Tulia Still Resounds, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 5, 2004, at 1. 
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and the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor.81 Their 
sentences ranged from eighteen to ninety years in prison,82 a combined 
total of 750 years.83
The human consequences of wrongful convictions are tragic. 
Imagine spending even one night on death row as an innocent person. 
Imagine spending ten years in prison. Even after the wrongly convicted 
are exonerated, the damage continues. The stigma of a prosecution and 
conviction is lasting.84 Employment prospects are greatly diminished.85 
As former Labor Secretary Ray Donovan asked his prosecutor after his 
acquittal on criminal charges, “What office do I go to to get my 
reputation back?”86 Of course, the wrongly accused defendant is not the 
only one who suffers as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. Wrongful 
prosecutions, convictions, and incarcerations ruin lives and destroy 
families.87 The victim of the underlying crime and the victim’s family 
are denied closure and justice.88 When the real perpetrators remain free, 
other victims are exposed to future crimes and even death.89 In more 
than one instance when an innocent defendant was wrongly convicted 
and incarcerated for murder, the real murderer went on to commit other 
murders.90
While prosecutorial misconduct occurs with alarming frequency, 
safeguards and corrective measures have proven ineffective. Although 
numerous procedural protections (including jury trials, appellate review, 
and habeas corpus proceedings) are designed to protect the criminal 
defendant’s rights, they neither prevent nor correct prosecutorial 
misconduct. Moreover, other corrective measures including professional 
discipline and criminal prosecution of misbehaving prosecutors are 
almost never pursued. The following discussion will explain why each of 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Targeted in Tulia, Texas?, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/ 
60minutes/main575291.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). 
 84. See Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1297, 1305–07 (2000). 
 85. See id. at 1308–09. 
 86. Id. at 1307 (quoting George Lardner, Jr., Bronx Jury Acquits Donovan; Ex-Labor 
Secretary, Codefendants Cleared of Larceny Charges, WASH. POST, May 25, 1987, at A1). 
 87. See id. at 1308. 
 88. Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1864. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1864 n.81. 
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these safeguards fails to adequately protect innocent defendants from 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
First, the trial process fails to protect the defendant against 
prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, the same studies that catalogue 
prosecutorial misconduct also document the ineffectiveness of defense 
counsel in protecting the defendant’s rights.91 For example, a study of 
Illinois death penalty cases concluded that prosecutorial misconduct was 
responsible for twenty-one percent of reversals, while defense counsel 
error accounted for nineteen percent of reversals.92 The ineffectiveness 
of defense lawyers has been well documented, especially in death 
penalty cases.93 Defense lawyers in capital cases are not adequately 
paid94 and are not provided sufficient funds for investigations and 
experts.95 Moreover, they have a disproportionately high record of 
discipline and disbarment.96 The few attorneys willing to take on capital 
cases are often “thoroughly incapable of mounting an effective defense 
during either the guilt or punishment phases of the capital trial.”97
Trial judges also provide an insufficient check on prosecutorial 
misconduct. As the thousands of appellate findings of prosecutorial 
misconduct show, trial judges fail to protect the defendant from 
misconduct.98 Even when the trial court catches the misconduct and has 
the power to remedy the situation, the offending prosecutor is rarely 
 91. Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1850 (stating that the two most common categories of 
serious error were incompetent defense counsel (thirty-seven percent of reversals) and prosecutorial 
misconduct (sixteen percent of reversals)); see also HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1; SCHECK ET AL., 
supra note 1. 
 92. Hartman & Richards, supra note 1, at 423. 
 93. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 2, at 2102–10; Kenneth Williams, Mid-Atlantic People of 
Color Legal Scholarship Conference: The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1177, 1189–92 (2002). 
 94. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853–55 (1994); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse 
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 
329 (1995). In Massachusetts, private counsel appointed to represent indigents in criminal cases 
receive thirty-five dollars an hour, which is raised to fifty-four dollars an hour for handling a murder 
case. Leonard Post, Indigent Defense Services Blasted, NAT’L L.J., July 12, 2004, at 21. 
 95. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE 1–2 (2001); Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional 
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 398–99 (1995). 
 96. See Liebman, supra note 2, at 2102–10. 
 97. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 95, at 399. 
 98. See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 108–09. 
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identified publicly.99 This problem is exacerbated in states where judges 
stand for election.100 As Professor Liebman explains, state judges and 
the governors who appoint them run for office on high numbers of death 
sentences and may lose reelection if capital trials result in acquittals or 
life sentences.101
Second, appellate review is an inadequate check on prosecutorial 
misconduct for several reasons. To begin with, prosecutorial misconduct 
is rarely grounds for reversal of a conviction. Indeed, reversal is the 
exception, not the rule.102 Under the harmless error standard, a defendant 
must show not only that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, but also 
that the misconduct had a substantial, prejudicial effect.103 For example, 
when a defendant proves that a prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, the defendant is not entitled to a reversal of the conviction 
unless he also shows “that there is a reasonable probability that the 
 99. See United States v. Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739, 741 n.1 (D.N.H. 1992) (finding serious 
prosecutorial misconduct but declining to name the offender because the court had been advised to 
eliminate the name); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 831 & n.448 (1999). 
 100. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2111–14. 
 101. Id. at 2112. Professor Liebman provides examples of statements by governors about 
appointing death penalty proponents to the bench and of political attacks on judges who made 
unpopular decisions in death penalty cases. For example, Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist 
“proclaimed before a 1996 judicial election that he would appoint only death-penalty supporters to 
be criminal-court judges.” Id. at 2112 n.197 (quoting Alan Berlow, Wrong Man, ATL. MONTHLY, 
Nov. 1999, at 66, 80). California Governor Gray Davis reportedly told reporters “that voters elected 
him based on public positions in favor of capital punishment and abortion rights . . . [and] expect his 
[judicial] appointments to follow his political views: ‘My appointees . . . are not there to be 
independent agents. They are there to reflect the sentiments that I expressed during the campaign.’” 
Id. at 2113 n.197 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bart Jansen, 
Davis: Judicial Picks Should Follow My Lead, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 1, 2000, at A4 (quoting 
Gray Davis)). Professor Liebman also includes the example of the Tennessee Supreme Court justice 
voted off the court principally due to a silent concurrence in a death penalty reversal. Liebman, 
supra note 2, at 2113 (citing Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be 
Done Amid Efforts To Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 308–12 (1997), and Stephen B. Bright et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable 
Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases, 31 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 passim (1999)). Professor Liebman also refers to his own earlier 
work, Liebman et al., supra note 1 (discussing whether political pressure on judges may lead to high 
death sentencing rates), and also to the work of Bright and Keenan, Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. 
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election 
in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760–61, 765 (1995) (providing numerous examples of judges 
being removed from the bench because of their record in death penalty cases and of their 
replacements’ notable inclination to impose and uphold capital convictions). Liebman, supra note 2, 
at 2113. 
 102. See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 108–09. 
 103. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 776 (1946). 
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outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been 
disclosed.”104 In other words, even when the defendant establishes 
prosecutorial misconduct that may have influenced the conviction or 
sentence, the conviction is affirmed under the harmless error standard.105 
Thus, even when courts find prosecutorial misconduct, they generally 
affirm the conviction or sentence. Recent empirical studies illustrate this 
point. Specifically, the Center for Public Integrity studied 11,452 cases in 
which prosecutorial misconduct was alleged.106 The appellate courts 
granted relief in 2012 cases but found that the prosecutorial misconduct 
amounted to harmless error in 8709 cases.107 Similarly, between 1993 
and 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Courts found 
167 instances of prosecutorial misconduct but affirmed 122 of the 
convictions on the grounds that the misconduct was harmless.108
Even when the appellate court reverses a conviction on grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor who engaged in the misconduct 
generally escapes any repercussions. The consequence of a reversal is 
that the defendant will be retried or have a new sentencing hearing. The 
offending prosecutor is rarely identified by name.109 Moreover, the loss 
on appeal is charged not to the original local prosecutor who committed 
the misconduct, but to the unfortunate lawyer in the state attorney 
general’s office who inherited the case for purposes of the appeal.110 
Thus, the trial attorney who engaged in the misconduct often escapes 
 104. Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)). 
 105. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–96 (finding harmless error where prosecutor failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45–55 (1992) (holding 
harmless error where prosecutor engaged in misconduct before the grand jury); Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178–82 (1986) (holding harmless error where prosecutor delivered 
improper closing argument). 
 106. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 108–09. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2128 n.239 (citing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break 
Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at N1); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 
475 n.13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting authorities arguing 
that the harmless error standard encourages prosecutorial misconduct and undermines the integrity of 
the criminal justice process). 
 109. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2126; see also Henning, supra note 99, at 830–31 (describing 
United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993), in which the Ninth Circuit found that the 
Assistant United States Attorney engaged in extensive and persistent misconduct including lying to 
the trial court; in the slip opinion remanding the case to determine whether it should be dismissed 
due to the misconduct, the offending attorney was named, but the final opinion deleted the name). 
But see Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999) (naming the prosecutor). 
 110. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121. 
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responsibility.111 Without meaningful trial or appellate court 
consequences for misconduct, prosecutors may be sorely tempted to bend 
the ethical and constitutional rules to obtain convictions since trial 
success is essential to political success for elected prosecutors, and since 
convictions are essential to favorable evaluations and promotions for 
subordinate prosecutors.112
Even when a court is willing to publicly name the prosecutor, the 
admonition seems to have no effect. For example, in 1999, the Florida 
Supreme Court expressed its exasperation with the persistent 
prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases that resulted in 
reversals:113
In spite of our admonishment in [a prior case reversing a death penalty 
conviction] and despite subsequent warnings that prosecutorial 
misconduct will be subject to disciplinary proceedings of The Florida 
Bar, we nevertheless continue to encounter this problem with 
unacceptable frequency. The present case follows on the heels of 
another misconduct case and is one of the worst examples we have 
encountered.114
In addition to finding that the conduct at issue “crossed the line of 
zealous advocacy by a wide margin and compromised the integrity of the 
proceeding,”115 the court also cited six prior death penalty cases that it 
had been compelled to reverse because of prosecutorial misconduct.116
Third, while it is difficult to correct prosecutorial misconduct in the 
direct appeal, it is even more difficult on collateral review in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
 111. Id. at 2122–25. Indeed, Professor Liebman provides examples from the Chicago Tribune 
report in which prosecutors were actually promoted despite scathing rebukes from the Illinois 
Appellate Court for their misconduct. Id. at 2125 n.232 (citing Armstrong & Possley, supra note 
108, at N1). 
 112. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 n.63 (1991). 
 113. Ruiz, 743 So. 2d at 9–10. 
 114. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted). 
 115. Ruiz, 743 So. 2d at 8–10.  
 116. Id. (citing Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998); Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720 
(Fla. 1996); King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993); Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325, 1332 (Fla. 
1993); Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1356 (Fla. 1990); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 
(Fla. 1988)); see also Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985) (finding that the 
prosecutor’s misconduct was not “so outrageous as to taint the validity of the jury’s 
recommendation” of death, but holding that the prosecutorial misconduct, despite prior admonitions, 
warranted disciplinary proceedings). 
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Penalty Act (AEDPA) set strict time limits in habeas proceedings.117 
Under AEDPA, federal courts must be deferential to state court 
convictions.118 Thus, federal judges have found that they are powerless 
to grant relief even when they find credible evidence of actual 
innocence.119 In one case, the defendant was convicted based on the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses.120 One recanted and admitted perjury, 
and the other’s testimony was challenged by an associate who said it was 
physically impossible for the witness to have seen the crime.121 As the 
court explained its inability to grant relief: 
One cannot read the record in this case without developing a nagging 
suspicion that the wrong man may have been convicted of capital 
murder and armed criminal action in a Missouri courtroom. . . . A 
layperson would have little trouble concluding Burton should be 
permitted to present his evidence of innocence in some forum. 
Unfortunately, Burton’s claims and evidence run headlong into the 
thicket of impediments erected by courts and by Congress. Burton’s 
legal claims permit him no relief, even as the facts suggest he may well 
be innocent.122
In other words, since AEDPA review is so restricted, it is not an effective 
procedure for correcting prosecutorial misconduct. 
Fourth, just as the adversary process fails to prevent or correct 
prosecutorial misconduct, disciplinary proceedings are also inadequate to 
address the problem because they are rarely instituted against 
prosecutors.123 Specifically, the report by the Center for Public Integrity 
 117. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 39. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides that prisoners in 
state custody must file habeas petitions within one year of certain triggering events, in most cases the 
date the state conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides parallel deadlines for prisoners in 
federal custody. 
 118. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 39. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a federal court must 
assume that a state court finding of fact is correct and can only reject the finding based on clear and 
convincing evidence of error. 
 119. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 40–41. 
 120. Id. at 40. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121 n.227 (citing Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row 
Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at N1); Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and 
Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute 
Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1184–89 (1996); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: 
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
851, 898–900 (1995); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady 
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 718–31 (1987); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical 
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found that since 1970 there were more than 2000 cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct requiring appellate correction for harmful error.124 But there 
were only forty-four instances in which disciplinary action was taken and 
only two disbarments. Another study apparently found that from 1886 to 
2000 there were only 100 cases of disciplinary proceedings against 
prosecutors, less than one per year across the entire country.125 And 
although the Chicago Tribune study found 381 reversed convictions 
resulting from prosecutorial misconduct in suppressing exculpatory 
evidence and introducing false evidence, it found not a single instance in 
which the prosecutor received a public sanction.126
And finally, while in theory prosecutors could be criminally 
prosecuted for their misconduct, in fact they almost never are.127 
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 242 provides criminal liability for government 
officials who violate constitutional protections.128 But since § 242 was 
adopted in 1866,129 research discloses only one conviction of a 
prosecutor under this statute.130 Indeed, although the Supreme Court 
cited § 242 as a basis for criminally prosecuting prosecutors who engage 
Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 966–67 (1984); Joseph R. Weeks, No 
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors To Disclose 
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 881–96 (1997); Williams, supra note 3, at 
3441; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 181. 
 124. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i. 
 125. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor 
Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 124 (2001) (discussing Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional 
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001)). 
 126. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1. 
 127. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2122. 
 128. Section 242 provides in pertinent part: 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully 
subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than one year, or both . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996). 
 129. Section 242 was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It was 
readopted after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180–85 (1961); see also Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and 
Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1985). 
 130. Brophy v. Comm. on Prof’l Standards, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Rosen, 
supra note 123, at 703 n.56, 726; Weeks, supra note 123, at 878–79 n.259. Somewhat ironically, the 
criminal conviction was treated as a mitigating factor in the state disciplinary proceeding. Brophy, 
442 N.Y.S.2d at 819. One other case involved an attorney who wrongfully invoked the criminal 
process to extract money from the defendant, but it is not clear whether the attorney was a public 
official. See In re Anderson, 177 S.E.2d 130 (S.C. 1970). 
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in misconduct, the Court cited no case in which this has actually 
happened.131
In short, prosecutorial misconduct is alarmingly common, and there 
is no corrective mechanism, no accountability, no effective deterrent, 
and—because of prosecutorial immunities—often no civil remedy. As 
one commentator observed, the arguments supporting absolute 
prosecutorial immunity “offer a wry blend of fairy tale and horror 
story.”132
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO § 1983 LIABILITY AND COMMON-
LAW IMMUNITIES 
As this section will show, the Court has developed a functional 
approach to the application of common-law immunities in § 1983 
actions.133 Depending on the function being performed, a government 
officer is either entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.134 Absolute 
immunity shields the officer from liability even though she acted in bad 
faith and with malice.135 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, protects 
the officer unless she violated clearly established law of which a 
reasonable officer would have known.136 The following section explains 
this development. It first outlines the significance of § 1983 liability in 
civil rights enforcement and then traces the Court’s early analysis of the 
application of common-law immunities in § 1983 litigation. 
A. Section 1983 
Until the Civil War, the constitutional protections of the Bill of 
Rights applied only to the federal government, not to the states.137 At the 
close of the Civil War, Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment, 
which outlawed slavery and essentially transformed the Emancipation 
Proclamation into a constitutional right.138 But the Thirteenth 
 131. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976). 
 132. R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 339 (1959). 
 133. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); see also 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 7:2 (2003); 1 STEVEN H. 
STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 15:2 (2002). 
 134. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1982); 1 
STEINGLASS, supra note 133, § 15:3. 
 135. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 136. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; 1 STEINGLASS, supra note 133, § 15:7. 
 137. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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Amendment failed to adequately protect the rights and safety of the 
newly freed slaves, and a reign of violence took hold in the South.139 In 
response, Congress adopted the first Reconstruction civil rights statute, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.140 In part because it doubted the 
constitutional authority for this statute,141 in 1868 Congress adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires states to provide citizens due 
process and equal protection of the law.142 In 1871, buttressed by the 
constitutional authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
essentially readopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which is codified 
today as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.143 As Justice Blackmun has explained, 
“Taken collectively, the Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights 
Acts, and these new jurisdictional statutes, all emerging from the caldron 
of the War Between the States, marked a revolutionary shift in the 
relationship among individuals, the States, and the Federal 
Government.”144
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .145
For nearly 100 years, § 1983 remained essentially dormant.146 But in 
1961, the Court held in Monroe v. Pape.147 that § 1983 applied when 
 139. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–79 (1961). 
 140. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 4–5; Jacques L. Schillaci, Unexamined Premises: Toward 
Doctrinal Purity in Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 447 
(2002).
 141. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 6–8. 
 142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 1:3 (2004); Blackmun, supra note 129, at 4–5; Schillaci, supra note 140, 
at 447. 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was originally enacted as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
17 Stat. 13, which was essentially a reenactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Monroe, 365 
U.S. at 167, 171, 185; see also 1 NAHMOD, supra note 133, § 1:3 (explaining that § 1983 was 
patterned after the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
 144. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 6. 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). 
 146. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); see also HAROLD S. LEWIS, 
JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (2001); Blackmun, supra note 
129, at 19–20. 
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police officers violated a person’s civil rights by an abuse of their official 
office, despite the availability of a state remedy. Since Monroe, § 1983 
has been the major remedy for civil rights violations by state and local 
officials.148 It provides the primary enforcement mechanism for many 
statutory provisions as well as constitutional guarantees.149 In addition, 
despite the absence of statutory authority, the Court adopted a 
companion remedy for redressing violations by federal officials in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.150 
The frequent use of these two civil rights remedies has not been without 
controversy.151 But given their lengthy and well-established 
jurisprudence, it seems highly unlikely that the Court will return to an 
interpretation of § 1983 and Bivens that significantly diminishes their 
role in civil rights enforcement. 
B. Common-Law Immunities in § 1983 Actions 
As § 1983 and Bivens actions came into frequent use, the Court faced 
the question of whether immunity defenses would be available to 
officials sued for civil rights violations.152 Nothing in the language of § 
1983 suggests that Congress intended to extend official immunity 
defenses to defendants in civil rights actions, and the legislative history 
 147. 365 U.S. 167, 185–91 (1961). 
 148. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the 
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 497 (1992). 
 149. KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 43 (1998). 
 150. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). For purposes of the immunity defenses, the Court treats § 1983 
and Bivens actions the same. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986) (“[I]t is untenable 
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials 
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). 
 151. Compare Blackmun, supra note 129, at 1 (arguing that § 1983 was an important vehicle 
for maintaining a federal forum for the protection of federal rights), and James K. Park, The 
Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (2003) (arguing 
that monetary remedies for constitutional torts serve not only the goals of compensation and 
deterrence, but also provide individual remedies that help spur the development of constitutional 
rights, norms that regulate government action, and structural solutions to systemic problems), with 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) 
(arguing that courts interpret constitutional rights narrowly in order to reduce government exposure 
to money damages), and Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (arguing that constitutional torts 
have a limited deterrent effect and are not economically justified). 
 152. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executive immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial 
immunity). 
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does not demonstrate that Congress intended to preserve immunities.153 
Indeed, since the whole goal of the statute was to impose liability on 
state officials who violated constitutional rights, it seems doubtful that 
Congress intended to insulate officials who were violating civil rights by 
granting them immunity.154
According to the Court, however, the 1871 Congress presumably 
acted against the backdrop of the established common-law immunities of 
the time.155 In the Court’s view, if Congress had intended to effect such 
a momentous change in the law as to eliminate common-law immunities, 
that would be clear from the legislative history.156 Since the legislative 
record does not affirmatively support this intent, the Court inferred from 
the congressional silence that Congress intended to retain the common-
law immunities.157 For this reason, the starting point for analyzing 
immunity defenses under § 1983 is the relevant common law as it existed 
in 1871 when § 1983 was adopted.  
The Court first held that common-law immunities applied in § 1983 
actions in Tenney v. Brandhove.158 In Tenney, members of the Un-
American Activities Committee of the California Senate were sued for 
violating the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.159 The Court held that 
the legislators were protected by legislative immunity, which was 
reflected in English common law and the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
federal and state constitutions.160 As Justice Frankfurter explained, 
quoting a member of the constitutional Committee of Detail, 
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to 
discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably 
necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he 
should be protected from the resentment of every one, however 
 153. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559–60 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 
U.S. 367, 382–83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Achtenberg, supra note 148, at 502–11; Note, 
Liability of Judicial Officers Under § 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325–28 (1969). 
 154. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559–60 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 382–83 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Achtenberg, supra note 148, at 502–11; Note, supra note 153, at 325–28. 
 155. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
349, 356 (1978); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. 
 156. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; 
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. 
 157. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; 
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. 
 158. 341 U.S. 367. 
 159. Id. at 370–71. 
 160. Id. at 372–73. 
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powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion 
offence.161
The Court concluded that this historical immunity survived the passage 
of § 1983, explaining, “We cannot believe that Congress—itself a 
staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition 
so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general 
language [of § 1983].”162
While the Court held that legislative immunity applied in § 1983 
actions, it limited its application to conduct within the legislative 
function that the immunity was designed to protect.163 To protect the 
legislative function, the Court has applied legislative immunity to 
nonlegislators when they are performing legislative functions.164 But for 
acts to be covered, they must be an integral part of the legislative 
process;165 legislative immunity does not apply to activities outside the 
legislative function.166
After recognizing absolute legislative immunity, the Court next 
addressed the issue of judicial immunity in § 1983 actions.167 In Pierson 
v. Ray,168 the Court held that judges were also entitled to absolute 
immunity from liability under § 1983. In the Court’s view, “Few 
doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the 
immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within 
their judicial jurisdiction.”169 This well-established doctrine was not 
intended to be abolished by the adoption of § 1983.170 Under this 
doctrine, judges of courts of general jurisdiction “are not liable to civil 
actions for their judicial acts, even where such acts are in excess of their 
 161. Id. at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 
(Andrews ed. 1896)). 
 162. Id. at 376. 
 163. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 149, 
at 72–73; 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, § 7:4. 
 164. Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 733–34 (1980) (holding that state 
supreme court justices receive legislative immunity when adopting the state bar code because this is 
a legislative function). 
 165. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, at § 7:4. 
 166. For example, legislative immunity does not protect a legislator engaged in private 
publishing through a commercial publisher nor for personnel decisions regarding his staff. See 
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), explained in Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, at § 7:4. 
 167. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
 168. 386 U.S. at 553–54. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 554–555; Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225. 
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jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or 
corruptly.”171 As the Court has explained, the policy underlying the 
immunity was “for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the 
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence 
and without fear of consequences.”172 As with absolute legislative 
immunity, absolute judicial immunity is confined to the function it is 
intended to protect.173  
In contrast to the absolute immunity afforded legislators and judges, 
executive officers—from police officers to governors—receive only 
qualified immunity.174 As the Court explained in rejecting a claim for 
absolute executive immunity, the common law never granted police 
officers absolute immunity but rather afforded them qualified immunity 
so long as they acted reasonably and in good faith.175 This same 
qualified immunity, according to the Court, applied as well to high-level 
executive officers.176 In refusing to extend absolute immunity to police 
officers, the Court emphasized that its “role is to interpret the intent of 
Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice . . 
. . Since the statute on its face does not provide for any immunities, we 
would be going far to read into it an absolute immunity for conduct 
which was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871.”177
Moreover, qualified immunity is presumed to provide the appropriate 
balance between protecting government functions and compensating 
victims of misconduct.178 In the Court’s view, qualified immunity 
attempts to “balance between the evils inevitable in any available 
alternative.”179 It offers victims a remedy for egregious abuses of office 
while protecting honest officials from excessive exposure to liability and 
tempering the attendant social costs of litigation, diversion of official 
energy, and deterrence of citizens from accepting public office.180 The 
 171. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Stump, 435 U.S. at 355–56. 
 172. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226–27. 
 173. For example, a judge is not entitled to absolute immunity for the unconstitutional 
discharge of a court employee since that act is administrative in nature and therefore outside the 
scope of absolute judicial immunity. See id. at 224, 227–29; 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, § 7:15. 
 174. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245 (1974). 
 175. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 245. 
 176. Id. at 246–49. 
 178. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492–
94 (1990); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920–21 (1984). 
 178. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87. 
 179. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14. 
 180. Id. at 814. 
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Court has repeatedly held that the official seeking absolute immunity has 
the burden of showing that it is justified, and that qualified rather than 
absolute immunity is presumed to provide sufficient protection to 
government officials.181  
Over time, however, the Court became dissatisfied with the good-
faith test for qualified immunity and developed a new, purely objective 
test. As the Court explained, “substantial costs attend the litigation of the 
subjective good faith of government officials.”182 Specifically, the Court 
found that subjective inquiries entail a consideration of the actor’s 
experiences, values, and emotions and thus can rarely be decided by 
summary judgment.183 The subjective test leads to broad-ranging 
discovery, which “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective 
government.”184 The immunity defenses are intended to shield officials 
not only from the burden of liability, but also from the burden of 
litigation.185 So, to better achieve the proper balance, the court adopted 
an objective standard whereby “government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”186
As this summary shows, the Court has developed a functional 
approach to immunity defenses available in § 1983 actions. For essential 
government functions needing special protection, the Court applies 
 181. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)); Malley, 
475 U.S. at 340; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). 
 182. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 817. 
 185. Id. at 815–18. 
 186. Id. at 818. The Court has refined this objective standard. As the Court explained in 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), the right must be established not in a vague and 
abstract sense, but 
in a more particularized, and hence more relevant sense: The contours of the right must 
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right. This is not to say that an official is protected by qualified immunity 
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that 
in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Id. The most recent case addressing the qualified immunity test, Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730 
(2002), held that novel facts did not preclude finding that the officer had violated clearly established 
law of which a reasonable officer would have known. In Hope, the officer had handcuffed the 
plaintiff to a hitching post for several hours in the hot sun without water or bathroom breaks. Id. at 
733–35. The Court held that although there were no prior reported cases with similar facts, the 
wanton infliction of pain violated clearly established law. Id. at 741–46. 
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absolute immunity.187 Absolute immunity is rarely granted and is 
reserved for critical government functions where the defendant 
establishes both a common-law basis for the immunity and a public 
policy need for it.188 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, is presumed 
to be the applicable immunity and to afford sufficient protection to 
government functions.189 This immunity attempts to balance the need to 
protect the official function from undue liability against the need to 
protect civil rights, compensate victims, and deter official misconduct.190 
The following sections discuss the application of these immunity 
defenses in § 1983 actions for prosecutorial misconduct. 
IV. THE CURRENT LAW 
A. The Supreme Court’s Functional Approach to  
Prosecutorial Immunity 
As the Court developed its functional immunity doctrine, it decided a 
series of cases determining the appropriate level of immunity for 
prosecutors in § 1983 actions.191 Specifically, the Court has held that 
prosecutors who act as advocates are protected by absolute immunity 
while prosecutors who act as administrators or investigators are protected 
by qualified immunity.192 This Section will summarize the Court’s 
 187. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 
486–87 (1990). 
 188. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–87. 
 189. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14. 
 190. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 813–14. 
 191. See Anne H. Burkett, Kalina v. Fletcher: Another Qualification of Imbler’s Prosecutorial 
Immunity Doctrine, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial 
Immunity—The Interpretation Continues, TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 80; McNamara, supra note 123; 
Brian P. Barrow, Note, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: Tradition Pays a Price for the Reduction of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 301 (1995); Jeffrey J. McKenna, Note, 
Prosecutorial Immunity: Imbler, Burns, and Now Buckley v. Fitzsimmons—The Supreme Court’s 
Attempt To Provide Guidance in a Difficult Area, 1994 BYU L. REV. 663; Deborah S. Platz, Note, 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: The Beginning of the End for Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 18 NOVA 
L. REV. 1919 (1994); Megan M. Rose, Note, The Endurance of Prosecutorial Immunity—How the 
Federal Courts Vitiated Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1019 (1996). 
 192. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269–70; Burns, 500 U.S. at 
487–96. Under the functional approach, prosecutorial immunities apply not only to prosecutors, but 
also to other officials performing prosecutorial functions. Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1643, 1644 (1999). Thus, social workers who are functioning as 
prosecutors have been protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 1645 (citing Ernst v. 
Children & Family Servs., 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997); Thompson v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 
85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996)). As Professor Chemerinsky points out, other cases have afforded 
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development of these prosecutorial immunities in four cases: Imbler v. 
Pachtman,193 Burns v. Reed,194 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,195 and Kalina v. 
Fletcher.196 As this line of cases shows, the Court has attempted to 
provide some guidance for determining whether a prosecutor was acting 
as an advocate entitled to absolute immunity or an administrator or 
investigator entitled to qualified immunity. The margins, however, are 
blurry and indistinct. 
1. Imbler v. Pachtman 
In the landmark case of Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court held that 
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983.197 Imbler 
was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death following a trial 
in which the prosecutor knowingly used false evidence and suppressed 
exculpatory evidence.198 Freed by a writ of habeas corpus after serving 
nine years in prison,199 Imbler sued the prosecutor for money damages 
under § 1983.200 The action was dismissed based on absolute 
immunity,201 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the 
question of prosecutorial immunity.202
As the Court had previously concluded in cases involving legislators 
and judges, § 1983 should “be read in harmony with general principles of 
tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.”203 
Presented with its first opportunity to address the immunity of a state 
prosecutor in a § 1983 action, the Court began by exploring “the 
immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and 
the interests behind it.”204 The Court found that the historical immunity 
social workers only qualified immunity. Id. at 1645 (citing White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Defore v. Premore, 86 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 193. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 194. 500 U.S. 478 (1990). 
 195. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
 196. 522 U.S. 118 (1997). 
 197. 424 U.S. at 427. 
 198. Id. at 412–13. After the trial, when Pachtman discovered additional evidence 
corroborating Imbler’s alibi defense, he wrote to the Governor of California to advise him of the new 
evidence. Id. at 412. 
 199. Id. at 414–15. 
 200. Id. at 415–16. 
 201. Id. at 416. 
 202. Id. at 417. 
 203. Id. at 418. 
 204. Id. at 421. 
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of prosecutors was grounded on the same policies as the immunities of 
judges and grand jurors.205 “These include concern that harassment by 
unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s 
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade 
his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment 
required by his public trust.”206
Finding the common-law rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity to 
be “well settled,”207 the Court concluded that public policy supported the 
continuance of the doctrine under § 1983 because the threat of civil 
liability would undermine prosecutorial performance and constrain 
independent decisionmaking.208 The Court anticipated that actions 
against prosecutors “could be expected with some frequency, for a 
defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into 
the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State’s 
advocate.”209 In the Court’s view, the potential flood of civil litigation 
would divert energy, attention, and resources from the performance of 
prosecutorial functions.210 Moreover, as the Court explained, even 
honest prosecutors make mistakes under the constraints of limited time 
and information.211 Immunity permits prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion without fear that they will be held civilly liable, a fear that 
could lead them to withhold relevant and credible evidence lest it might 
turn out to be false.212 Thus, to the Court, absolute immunity was 
necessary because exposure to civil liability would undermine the 
prosecutorial function and in turn the criminal justice system.213
In the Court’s analysis, the burden and distraction of imposing civil 
liability was unwarranted because other corrective mechanisms would 
safeguard the accused’s rights. The Court listed “the remedial powers of 
the trial judge, appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction 
 205. Id. at 422–23. 
 206. Id. at 423. 
 207. Id. at 424; see also id. at 424 n.21 (citing authorities to support this “well settled” rule, 
the earliest of which was Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla. 1933)). But see infra Part 
V.A (discussing the absence of historical support for the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity).  
 208. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28. 
 209. Id. at 425. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 425–26. 
 213. Id. at 426. 
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collateral remedies.”214 The Court also suggested that prosecutors could 
be subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal 
analogue to § 1983, as well as professional discipline.215 The Court 
acknowledged that its ruling left the “genuinely wronged defendant 
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest 
action deprives him of liberty.”216 But it concluded that in this instance it 
is “‘better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers 
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of 
retaliation.’”217
2. Burns v. Reed 
Fifteen years later, the Court refined the scope of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity in Burns v. Reed.218 In Burns, a mother reported 
that her two sons had been shot by an unknown assailant.219 When the 
police concluded that she was the chief suspect, the prosecutor wrongly 
advised them that they could seek a confession from the mother while 
she was hypnotized.220 The prosecutor then used that confession to 
establish probable cause for her arrest.221 When these facts were 
revealed, the trial judge ordered the “confession” suppressed and the 
prosecutor dropped all charges.222 Burns brought a § 1983 action for 
damages against the prosecutor.223 The action was dismissed on the 
ground of absolute immunity.224 The Court granted certiorari to clarify 
the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.225
The Court noted that in Imbler it had held that absolute immunity 
covered the initiation and presentation of the State’s case insofar as that 
conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 
criminal process” but had declined to consider whether that immunity 
would extend to a prosecutor’s conduct as an administrator or 
 214. Id. at 427. 
 215. Id. at 428–429. 
 216. Id. at 427. 
 217. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 218. 500 U.S. 478 (1990). 
 219. Id. at 481. 
 220. Id. at 482. 
 221. Id. at 482. 
 222. Id. at 483. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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investigator as opposed to conduct as an advocate.226 As the Court 
observed, under the functional approach, “the official seeking absolute 
immunity bears the burden of showing that [it] is justified” and must 
overcome the presumption that qualified rather than absolute immunity is 
sufficient to protect government functions.227
The Court then turned to the question of whether absolute immunity 
should be extended to Reed’s participation in the probable cause hearing 
and provision of legal advice to the police. The Court concluded that 
Reed was entitled to absolute immunity from liability for participating in 
the probable cause hearing228 but only entitled to qualified immunity for 
providing legal advice to the police.229
In addressing the argument that Reed was liable for eliciting 
misleading testimony in the probable cause hearing, the Court first 
examined the common-law immunity for testimony in judicial 
proceedings. It found that witnesses, prosecutors, and other lawyers were 
absolutely immune from liability at common law for making false or 
defamatory statements and also for eliciting false and defamatory 
testimony.230 Justice White observed that in appearing before a judge 
and presenting evidence, the prosecutor was clearly acting in his role as 
an advocate, not as an investigator or administrator,231 and that this 
conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 
criminal process.”232 As before, the Court expressed confidence that 
“[t]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for 
private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional 
conduct.”233
Turning to the prosecutor’s conduct in providing legal advice to the 
police, the Court found no common-law support for extending absolute 
immunity to this activity234 and no policy reason to justify it.235 The 
 226. Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
430 (1976)). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 487. 
 229. Id. at 495–96. 
 230. Id. at 489–90. 
 231. Id. at 491. 
 232. Id. at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
430 (1976)). 
 233. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 
(1978)). 
 234. Id. at 492–94. 
 235. Id at 494–96. 
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Court emphasized that since § 1983 does not provide for any immunities, 
the Court would exceed its proper role in affording absolute immunity to 
conduct that was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871 when the 
statute was adopted.236 The Court noted that absolute immunity for legal 
advice was not necessary to protect prosecutors from vexatious litigation 
since suspects will rarely know advice was given.237
Moreover, the Court stated that this conduct is not intimately 
connected to the judicial process, which is the function prosecutorial 
immunity is designed to protect.238 As Justice White explained, 
“Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the 
harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. That concern 
therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that 
are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for 
every litigation-inducing conduct.”239 The Court stressed that the current 
qualified immunity defense is more protective than when Imbler was 
decided and now “provides ample protection to all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”240 Finally, the 
Court concluded that the other checks on unconstitutional misconduct, 
most importantly the protections afforded through the judicial process, 
will not effectively restrain out-of-court prosecutorial misconduct. 241
3. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons 
The Court returned to the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity 
in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.242 In Buckley, the question was whether 
absolute immunity protected prosecutors who conspired with police to 
fabricate evidence during the preliminary investigation of a highly 
publicized rape and murder.243 Specifically, the prosecutors retained an 
expert witness known for her willingness to fabricate evidence and who 
provided the entire basis for the prosecution by falsely connecting the 
 236. Id. at 494. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (citation omitted). 
 240. Id. at 494–95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986)). Since the Imbler decision, the Court had rejected the common-law good-faith standard 
for qualified immunity and adopted an objective standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815–18 (1982). See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text. 
 241. Burns, 500 U.S. at 496. 
 242. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
 243. Id. at 261–64. 
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defendant’s boots to the crime scene.244 The lower courts found that 
absolute immunity applied,245 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to refine the scope of prosecutorial immunity.246
The Court explained that, under the functional approach, absolute 
immunity shields adversary functions such as initiating judicial 
proceedings, evaluating evidence, and preparing presentations before a 
grand jury or trial.247 But “the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely 
immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.”248 Rather, 
the issue turns on the function the prosecutor was performing.249 The 
Court distinguished between the tasks performed by an advocate in 
preparing for trial and those of a detective investigating a crime to 
establish probable cause to arrest a suspect.250 As the Court concluded, 
“[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally 
performed by a detective or police officer, it is ‘neither appropriate nor 
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not 
the other.’”251
The Court then considered whether the prosecutors had met the 
burden of establishing that they were functioning as advocates when 
fabricating evidence that the boot print on the victim’s door had been 
made by Buckley’s boot.252 This conduct had occurred before the 
prosecutors had probable cause to arrest Buckley and before the grand 
jury investigation.253 As the Court concluded, “[The defendants’] 
mission at that time was entirely investigative in character. A prosecutor 
neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has 
 244. Id. at 262–63. The plaintiff also alleged that false statements at a press conference 
violated her civil rights. Id. at 261, 276. The Court held that qualified immunity applied to press 
conference statements for three reasons. First, there was no historical basis for applying absolute 
immunity since out-of-court statements by attorneys were not protected by the common law in 1871 
when § 1983 was adopted because such statements were not functionally connected to the judicial 
process. Id. at 277. Second, the Court has no license to extend absolute immunity beyond its 1871 
scope. Id. at 278. And third, qualified immunity is presumed to provide sufficient protection to 
government functions. Id. 
 245. Id. at 265. 
 246. Id. at 267. 
 247. Id. at 272–73. 
 248. Id. at 273. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
 252. Id. at 274. 
 253. Id. 
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probable cause to have anyone arrested.”254 The Court emphatically 
rejected the contention that a prosecutor may shield his investigative 
misconduct by presenting fabricated evidence to a grand jury or 
introducing it at trial because “every prosecutor might then shield 
himself from liability for any constitutional wrong against innocent 
citizens by ensuring that they go to trial.”255 The Court acknowledged 
that after probable cause is met, the prosecutor is not necessarily entitled 
to absolute immunity. As the Court explained, “Even after that 
determination . . . a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’ 
that is entitled to only qualified immunity.”256
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed 
out the difficulties that the majority’s approach would create for the 
lower courts.257 In his view, drawing a line between advocatory and 
investigatory functions requires “difficult and subtle distinctions” that are 
not clarified by the adoption of a probable cause requirement.258 To 
Justice Kennedy, the Court’s attempt to establish a “bright-line 
standard”259 “has created more problems than it has solved.”260 As will 
be discussed in Part IV.B, the application of the probable cause rule and 
the characterization of post-probable cause conduct have indeed proven 
troublesome to the lower courts. 
4. Kalina v. Fletcher 
The Court’s most recent decision on the scope of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity is Kalina v. Fletcher.261 In Kalina, the question 
posed was whether absolute immunity applied when a prosecutor made 
false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an 
arrest warrant.262 The prosecutor had initiated criminal proceedings by 
filing three documents: (1) an unsworn information charging the 
defendant with burglary; (2) an unsworn motion for the warrant; and (3) 
a certification summarizing the evidence supporting the charges, which 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 276. 
 256. Id. at 274 n.5. 
 257. Id. at 286–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 258. Id. at 290 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 259. Id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 260. Id. at 290 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 261. 522 U.S. 118 (1997). 
 262. Id. at 120. 
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was executed by the prosecutor under penalty of perjury.263 The third 
document, the certification (which implicated the suspect in the crime), 
was factually inaccurate in several respects.264 Based on these 
documents, the trial court found probable cause and issued the arrest 
warrant.265 After the charges were dismissed on the prosecutor’s 
motion,266 the plaintiff sued the prosecutor for damages under § 1983.267 
The District Court denied the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment 
on the basis of absolute immunity268 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.269 
In light of a conflict in the circuit courts on this question, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.270
Applying its functional immunity doctrine, the Court held that the 
prosecutor’s conduct in preparing the three documents was protected by 
absolute immunity because they were prepared as part of an advocate’s 
function.271 But the critical question was “whether she was acting as a 
complaining witness rather than a lawyer when she executed the 
certification ‘[u]nder penalty of perjury.’”272 As the Court had 
previously held, complaining witnesses are not entitled to immunity.273 
The Court concluded that the prosecutor was acting as a complaining 
witness, not an advocate, and therefore was not entitled to absolute 
 263. Id. at 120–21. 
 264. Id. at 121. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 122. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Fletcher v. Kalina, 93 F.3d 653 (9th Cir.1996). 
 270. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since a police officer would 
receive qualified immunity for false statements in an application for an arrest warrant under Malley 
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), a prosecutor should receive the same immunity for the same 
conduct. Fletcher, 93 F.3d at 655–56. But the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Sixth Circuit had 
reached a different conclusion in Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986). As the 
Supreme Court explained, “Because we have never squarely addressed the question whether a 
prosecutor may be held liable for conduct in obtaining an arrest warrant, we granted certiorari to 
resolve the conflict.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123. 
 271. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Malley, 475 U.S. at 335 (holding that a police officer only received qualified immunity 
for signing an affidavit in connection with an arrest warrant secured without probable cause). As the 
Court explained, complaining witnesses did not receive absolute immunity at common law. Id. at 
340–41. This function is distinguished from that of a witness during the judicial phase of the 
proceeding. Id. at 341–43; see also infra Part V.A (discussing absolute witness immunity at common 
law). 
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immunity for signing the false certification under penalty of perjury.274 
As the Court explained, the ethics of the legal profession counsel that 
advocates should not put their own credibility in issue.275 And while the 
prosecutor acting as an advocate could properly claim absolute immunity 
for evaluating the strength of the evidence to support the warrant and for 
determining which facts to include in the certification, “[t]estifying about 
facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.”276
In summary, the Court has relied on the common law of 1871 and 
various policy considerations in developing its prosecutorial immunity 
doctrine.277 It has afforded prosecutors either qualified or absolute 
immunity depending on the function they were performing at the time of 
the misconduct.278 Under the Court’s functional approach, when 
prosecutors act as administrators, investigators, or witnesses, qualified 
immunity applies.279 But when they act as advocates performing 
functions intimately connected with the judicial phase of the criminal 
proceeding, absolute immunity applies.280 In determining whether a 
prosecutor is acting as an investigator or advocate, the Court has held 
that before probable cause is established, a prosecutor functions as an 
investigator.281 After probable cause is established, a prosecutor may be 
acting as either an investigator or an advocate, depending on the function 
being performed.282 But, as the following discussion shows, the Court’s 
functional approach and probable cause requirement have produced 
conflicts and confusion in the lower courts and have generated subjective 
state-of-mind inquiries which preclude the early resolution of the 
litigation. 
B. Conflicts in the Lower Courts 
The Court’s functional approach to prosecutorial immunity has 
created conflicts and confusion as the lower courts attempt to grapple 
with the difficulty of characterizing prosecutorial misconduct and 
 274. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130–31. 
 275. Id. at 130. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 123–27; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85, 489–90; Imbler, 
424 U.S. at 422–24. 
 278. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125–27; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 485–86. 
 279. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125–26; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269–70. 
 280. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129–31; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270–71; Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. 
 281. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. 
 282. Id. at 274 n.5. 
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determining which immunity applies. Specifically, the circuit court 
decisions conflict: (1) on whether the criminal defendant’s due process 
rights are violated when a prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely; 
(2) on whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when she 
fabricates evidence or coerces a witness to testify falsely and then uses 
that tainted evidence in a judicial proceeding; (3) on the application of 
the Buckley probable cause requirement; and (4) on how to determine 
whether a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or advocate when she 
engages in misconduct after probable cause has been met. 
While the lower courts have been vexed with confusion about 
absolute prosecutorial immunity for many years, since 2003 this 
uncertainty has become increasingly problematic. Specifically, circuit 
courts have recently adopted subjective standards to determine whether 
the Buckley probable cause requirement has been met283 and whether the 
prosecutor was functioning as an advocate or an investigator after 
probable cause was met.284 The introduction of these subjective inquiries 
undermines the goal of providing a defense that can be resolved at the 
earliest stages of the litigation.285 As the following discussion will show, 
the confusion that the absolute immunity doctrine has generated supports 
the argument that the doctrine itself should be reconsidered. 
1. Due process rights and prosecutorial coercion of witnesses 
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,286 the plaintiff alleged that prosecutors 
violated his rights under the Due Process Clause by extracting 
incriminating statements from witnesses by coercing these witnesses and 
paying them money. The Court declined to rule on the due process claim 
because “the contours of [these] claims [were] unclear, and they were not 
addressed below.”287 In the decade since the Buckley decision, the circuit 
courts have split on the question of whether prosecutorial coercion of a 
witness violates the defendant’s rights. The Third and Seventh Circuits 
have held that prosecutorial coercion violates only the witness’s, not the 
 283. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028–32 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 284. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 F.3d 
1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); Broam, 320 
F.3d at 1033. 
 285. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–
18 (1982). 
 286. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
 287. Id. 
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defendant’s, rights.288 The Second Circuit held that prosecutorial 
misconduct in gathering evidence violates the criminal defendant’s due 
process rights.289 The Court has declined to grant certiorari to resolve 
this conflict,290 leaving victims without a remedy for a particularly 
egregious form of prosecutorial misconduct.291
In Buckley, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit 
considered the due process claim and found that it was not cognizable 
under § 1983.292 The court held that coercing witnesses and paying them 
for false testimony was not a constitutional wrong as to the criminally 
accused, but only to the person being interrogated.293 Thus, the plaintiff 
failed to state a valid due process claim.294
The Third Circuit followed the Buckley approach in Michaels v. New 
Jersey,295 in which a day-care worker was indicted, tried, and convicted 
of multiple counts of child abuse.296 The conviction was reversed on 
appeal because prosecutors and police officers had used coercive 
interview techniques with child witnesses during the investigation.297 
The day-care worker brought an action against the prosecutor under § 
1983.298 In concluding that the plaintiff had no remedy, the Third Circuit 
held that the criminal defendant could not sue for violations of the 
witnesses’ rights.299 While the court recognized that this approach left 
the plaintiff without a remedy, it concluded that the policies served by 
granting absolute immunity outweighed the harshness to the plaintiff and 
that the “‘[h]arm to a falsely-charged defendant is remedied by 
safeguards built into the judicial system—probable cause hearings, 
dismissal of the charges—and into the state codes of professional 
responsibility.’”300
 288. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 
F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 289. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 290. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118 (2001), denying cert. to 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 291. Id. at 1118–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 292. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794–96. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 296. Id. at 120. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 121. 
 299. Id. at 122. 
 300. Id. (quoting Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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In contrast to the Buckley and Michaels decisions, the Second Circuit 
has found that prosecutorial misconduct in evidence gathering violates 
the accused’s due process rights.301 In Zahrey v. Coffey, prosecutors 
coerced and bribed witnesses to concoct false statements against the 
accused.302 Following his acquittal,303 Zahrey filed a § 1983 and a 
Bivens action for wrongful prosecution.304 The Second Circuit held that 
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action because he had a due process 
right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of 
evidence by a government officer acting in an investigatory capacity.305 
The court acknowledged that mere fabrication—without more—would 
not violate due process.306 But when that fabricated evidence causes the 
deprivation of liberty, due process is violated.307 As the court explained, 
“The liberty deprivation is the eight months he was confined, from his 
bail revocation (after his arrest) to his acquittal, and the due process 
violation is the manufacture of false evidence.”308 Additionally, the court 
held that the subsequent use of the fabricated evidence by the same 
official who fabricated it did not break the chain of causation.309 
The seeds for this intercircuit conflict may have been planted by 
Justice Scalia in his Buckley concurrence.310 In his view, claims based on 
the fabrication of evidence “are unlikely to be cognizable under § 1983, 
since petitioner cites, and I am aware of, no authority for the proposition 
that the mere preparation of false evidence, as opposed to its use in a 
fashion that deprives someone of a fair trial or otherwise harms him, 
violates the Constitution.”311 This language has been construed to mean 
that a prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence cannot be used to establish a 
constitutional violation.312
 301. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 348–49 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 302. Id. at 345. 
 303. Id. at 346. 
 304. Id. at 344. 
 305. Id. at 348–49. 
 306. Id. at 348. 
 307. Id. at 348–49. 
 308. Id. at 348. 
 309. Id. at 353–54; see also Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a defendant in a criminal proceeding can challenge coerced statements by witnesses in 
affidavits to obtain an arrest warrant on due process grounds); infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the 
prosecutor’s in-court use of previously fabricated evidence). 
 310. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 279–82 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 311. Id. at 281–82 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 312. See McKenna, supra note 191, at 692–93. 
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Justice Thomas expresses a different view. When this circuit conflict 
was presented to the United States Supreme Court in a petition for 
certiorari in Michaels v. McGrath, Justice Thomas dissented from the 
Court’s denial of the petition.313 As he explained, “the decision below 
leaves victims of egregious prosecutorial misconduct without a remedy. 
In any event, even if I did not have serious doubt as to the correctness of 
the decision below, I would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict among 
the Courts of Appeals on this important issue.”314
Thus, the Court has left open the question of whether due process is 
violated when a prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely against a 
defendant, and the circuit courts are left in conflict.315 Given the current 
composition of the Supreme Court bench, one might expect that a 
majority of the current Court would find a cognizable claim.316 But even 
if the Court finds a cognizable due process claim, the victim will still be 
denied a remedy if absolute immunity applies. On the other hand, the 
victim would be entitled to recover if qualified immunity applies since 
coercing and bribing witnesses violates clearly established law. In other 
words, the answer to whether a person can recover in a civil rights action 
in which a prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely requires a 
resolution of both the due process question and the immunity question. 
2. Prosecutorial absolute immunity and the use of fabricated evidence 
The second conflict in the courts of appeals is whether absolute 
immunity applies when a prosecutor introduces tainted evidence that she 
had previously procured during the investigatory phase of the 
prosecution. The Third Circuit has held that absolute immunity 
applies,317 while the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that qualified 
immunity applies.318
 313. 531 U.S. 1118, 1118–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 314. Id. at 1119. 
 315. Id.; Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 316. McKenna, supra note 191, at 692–93. Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Thomas were in 
the majority in Buckley in finding that the prosecutor who fabricated evidence before probable cause 
existed was not entitled to absolute immunity. Justice Scalia concurred in the result. This would have 
been a meaningless ruling if they were then to have held that there was no cognizable claim. 
Moreover, since Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined the Court after the Buckley decision, it 
seems more likely that the Court would recognize a cause of action.  
 317. Michaels, 222 F.3d at 123. 
 318. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey, 221 F. 3d at 342. 
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In Michaels v. New Jersey,319 the Third Circuit held that a prosecutor 
is entitled to absolute immunity for introducing false evidence in a 
judicial proceeding that she had improperly procured. As explained 
above, Michaels held that coercing witnesses to testify falsely was not a 
violation of the accused’s due process rights.320 While the court 
recognized that the subsequent use of that coerced testimony in trial 
violated the accused’s right to due process, it explained that this 
constitutional wrong could not be redressed in a § 1983 action: the 
prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct because it 
occurred during the advocacy phase of the process.321
In contrast to the Third Circuit’s view, the Second Circuit held that a 
prosecutor who uses previously falsified evidence is only entitled to 
qualified immunity.322 In Zahrey, as discussed above, the prosecutor 
improperly induced witnesses to make false statements.323 The 
prosecutor conceded that his misconduct in the investigative phase 
“entitled him, at most, to only qualified immunity,”324 but argued that his 
subsequent use of the evidence in the judicial phase entitled him to 
absolute immunity.325
The court rejected this argument and held that coercing witnesses 
into changing their testimony was not advocacy, but a misuse of 
investigative techniques.326 The court further held that the subsequent 
use of that tainted evidence did not relate back so as to immunize the 
prior misconduct or break the causal chain.327 While the court 
acknowledged that sometimes subsequent intervening circumstances may 
break the chain of proximate causation, this is generally not true when 
the wrongdoer can foresee that his deliberate misconduct will contribute 
to a deprivation of liberty.328 Thus, when the same person commits both 
the initial act of misconduct and the subsequent intervening act directly 
causing the deprivation of liberty, the intervening act is not independent 
and does not break the causal chain.329 As the court explained: 
 319. 222 F.3d at 122. 
 320. Id. at 122–23. 
 321. Id. at 121–22. 
 322. Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 354. 
 323. Id. at 344–46. 
 324. Id. at 347. 
 325. Id. at 352–53. 
 326. Id. at 349, 356. 
 327. Id. at 352–54. 
 328. Id. at 352. 
 329. Id. at 353. 
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 Coffey acknowledged at oral argument that if he had fabricated 
evidence and handed it to another prosecutor who unwittingly used it to 
precipitate Zahrey’s loss of liberty, Coffey would be liable for the 
initial act of fabrication. It would be a perverse doctrine of tort and 
constitutional law that would hold liable the fabricator of evidence who 
hands it to an unsuspecting prosecutor but exonerate the wrongdoer 
who enlists himself in a scheme to deprive a person of liberty. If, as 
alleged, Coffey fabricated evidence in his investigative role, it was at 
least reasonably foreseeable that in his advocacy role he would later use 
that evidence before the grand jury, with the likely result that Zahrey 
would be indicted and arrested.330
The court also pointed out that allowing the prosecutor’s subsequent use 
of the evidence to break the chain of causation would expand the scope 
of absolute immunity to the investigatory phase.331
Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that subsequent use 
of tainted evidence in a judicial proceeding does not entitle the 
prosecutor to immunity for the prior misconduct.332 In Milstein v. 
Cooley, the plaintiff alleged that prosecutors obtained false statements 
from a witness for the purpose of prosecuting him.333 The court reasoned 
that the allegation was analogous to the claim in Buckley that the 
prosecutor had procured false expert testimony.334 Following Buckley, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecutor who fabricates evidence is only 
entitled to qualified immunity for that misconduct.335 While the court 
held that the prosecutor’s use of that fabricated evidence in securing an 
indictment was entitled to absolute immunity,336 it found that the later 
misconduct did not immunize the prior fabrication claim.337
This conflict in the courts of appeals was presented to the United 
States Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari in Michaels v. 
McGrath.338 The Court denied the petition with Justice Thomas 
dissenting, leaving unresolved the question of whether absolute 
immunity attaches when a prosecutor has fabricated evidence and then 
used that evidence in a judicial proceeding. 
 330. Id. at 353–54 (footnote omitted). 
 331. Id. at 353–54 n.10. 
 332. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 333. Id. at 1006. 
 334. Id. at 1011. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 1012. 
 337. Id. at 1011. 
 338. 531 U.S. 1118, denying cert. to Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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3. Application of the Buckley probable cause requirement 
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Court seemingly limited the 
application of absolute immunity to conduct occurring after probable 
cause exists.339 It held that prosecutorial misconduct that occurs before 
there is probable cause to arrest a defendant is necessarily 
investigative.340 As the Court explained, “A prosecutor neither is, nor 
should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause 
to have anyone arrested.”341 As this discussion will show, the application 
of the Buckley probable cause requirement has created confusion in the 
lower courts in two respects. First, the courts disagree as to whether 
probable cause is always required for the application of absolute 
immunity. Some courts disregard the probable cause requirement and 
apply absolute immunity whenever a prosecutor’s conduct involves 
initiating criminal proceedings.342 Second, the circuits are in conflict as 
to when the requirement is met.343 The Ninth Circuit has recently 
adopted a subjective standard,344 which undermines the entire purpose of 
the immunity defense by precluding its resolution in the early stages of 
the litigation.345
 
a. Is probable cause always required for absolute immunity to 
attach? The first question—whether probable cause is always required 
for absolute immunity to attach—arises out of the tension between 
Imbler v. Patchman346 and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.347 In Imbler, the 
Court held that absolute immunity applied to the initiation of criminal 
proceedings by the prosecutor because that conduct is intimately 
connected to the judicial phase of the criminal proceeding.348 But in 
 339. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274; see also supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. 
 340. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. 
 341. Id.; see also supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. 
 342. Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003); Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 
868, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2002); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002); Moore v. Valder, 65 
F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 343. Compare Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995), with Broam v. Bogan, 
320 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 344. Broam, 320 F.3d at 1029. 
 345. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815–18 (1982). 
 346. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 347. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
 348. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. 
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Buckley, the Court held that absolute immunity did not attach until after 
probable cause existed.349
The Court has not explained how to harmonize these two rules. They 
complement each other when the prosecutor initiates criminal 
proceedings after probable cause exists. In such a case, under both 
Imbler and Buckley, the prosecutor would be functioning as an advocate 
and would be entitled to absolute immunity. But which rule applies when 
the prosecutor initiates criminal proceedings without probable cause or 
when probable cause is based on tainted evidence? Does Imbler mean 
that initiating a criminal proceeding is always an advocacy function and 
therefore always protected by absolute immunity, regardless of probable 
cause? Or does Buckley qualify Imbler so that initiation of criminal 
proceedings is only an advocacy function after probable cause exists?350 
In other words, does Imbler mean that absolute immunity always applies 
to the initiation of criminal proceedings despite the absence of probable 
cause? Or does Buckley mean that absolute immunity can never apply 
until after probable cause exists? 
Several circuits, relying on Imbler and Burns, have held that absolute 
immunity applies when a prosecutor initiates criminal proceedings 
despite the lack of probable cause.351 These decisions seem to be at odds 
with the Buckley rule that, prior to the existence of probable cause, a 
prosecutor acts as an investigator, not as an advocate. For example, the 
Sixth Circuit recently applied absolute immunity despite the absence of 
probable cause.352 In Spurlock v. Thompson, two defendants were falsely 
charged with and convicted of murder based entirely on coerced false 
statements, which created probable cause.353 Ultimately an investigation 
revealed that others had confessed to the murder and the convictions 
were vacated.354 In the subsequent civil rights action, the Sixth Circuit 
 349. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. 
 350. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1159. 
 351. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a prosecutor 
was entitled to absolute immunity although the defendant was falsely charged based on coerced false 
statements); Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a prosecutor 
was entitled to absolute immunity even though no evidence supported the charges against the 
defendant); Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a prosecutor was entitled to 
absolute immunity for initiating a prosecution even though he knew the defendant was innocent, he 
concealed exculpatory evidence, and he manipulated grand jury testimony); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 
1141 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prosecutor who twice filed charges without probable cause was 
entitled to absolute immunity); see also Rose, supra note 191, at 1046–59. 
 352. Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 791. 
 353. Id. at 794. 
 354. Id. 
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concluded that presenting false evidence at trial is an advocacy function 
intimately connected with the judicial phase of the criminal trial and 
therefore is protected by absolute immunity.355 But the court did not 
address the role of probable cause in determining whether absolute 
immunity applied, despite its acknowledgement that probable cause was 
entirely based on false testimony.356 If, under Buckley, probable cause is 
required before a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity, the 
prosecutor should have received qualified, not absolute, immunity 
because probable cause never really existed. 
While these circuits essentially disregard the Buckley probable cause 
requirement when the prosecutor’s conduct consists of initiating criminal 
proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has tried to harmonize Imbler and 
Buckley. For example, in Milstein v. Cooley,357 the plaintiff alleged that 
the prosecutor acquired false statements and fabricated evidence, which 
she then used to secure a grand jury indictment. Citing Buckley, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor was not entitled to absolute 
immunity for fabricating this evidence because the conduct occurred 
before the existence of probable cause, which in fact was never met.358 
But then, citing Imbler, the court held that absolute immunity applied to 
the presentation of this evidence to the grand jury because that activity 
initiated the criminal prosecution and thus was an advocacy function.359 
Perhaps this is the proper accommodation of the two rules. But since 
probable cause never existed,360 granting the prosecutor absolute 
immunity seems contrary to the Buckley admonition that a prosecutor is 
not entitled to be treated as an advocate before probable cause exists. 
In short, while Buckley appeared to establish probable cause as the 
threshold for absolute immunity,361 the lower courts have not 
consistently applied this standard when the conduct at issue consists of 
initiating criminal proceedings or engaging in conduct intimately 
connected with the judicial phase of the proceedings.362
 355. Id. at 798. 
 356. Id. at 799. 
 357. 257 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 358. Id. at 1011. 
 359. Id. at 1011–12. 
 360. Id. at 1011. 
 361. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. 
 362. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003); Higgason v. Stephens, 
288 F.3d 868, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2002); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002); Moore v. 
Valder, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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b. When is the probable cause requirement satisfied? Apart from the 
tension between the Imbler and Buckley approaches with respect to 
whether probable cause is always required for absolute immunity, courts 
are confused on the second issue, which is how to determine whether the 
probable cause requirement has been met. Buckley does not provide any 
guidance to the lower courts on how to determine whether probable 
cause has been met or who is to determine its existence.363 Justice 
Kennedy raised this potential problem in his concurring and dissenting 
opinion.364 As he observed, it was not clear from the majority opinion 
whether the probable cause line is crossed when the prosecutor believes 
it is met or whether a determination by a neutral third party is 
required.365 Does a formal finding of probable cause in the criminal 
proceeding operate to collaterally estop litigation of the issue in a 
subsequent civil rights action? What if the formal finding is obtained 
through the use of false testimony or fabricated evidence? If the finding 
of probable cause in the criminal proceeding is tainted by prosecutorial 
misconduct, is probable cause to be determined by an objective, after-
the-fact analysis in the civil rights action? As the following discussion 
will show, the cases considering these issues are in a state of confusion. 
Some courts have held that probable cause is met when it is officially 
found to exist in the initial criminal proceedings. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit has found that, in some instances, a finding of probable cause in 
the criminal action will collaterally estop the defendant from challenging 
probable cause in a subsequent civil rights action.366 But the Ninth 
Circuit has found exceptions to this rule,367 and this approach is not 
followed when the official probable cause determination is gained by 
presenting false evidence or withholding exculpatory evidence.368
The difficulty of determining the point at which probable cause 
exists for purposes of granting the prosecutor absolute immunity is well-
illustrated by a recent Ninth Circuit case, Broam v. Bogan.369 The 
plaintiff was wrongly convicted of sexual abuse of his son and spent 
eight years in prison as the result of misconduct by the prosecutor and 
 363. See Rose, supra note 191, at 1044–46. 
 364. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 287 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 365. Id. 
 366. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 288–91 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 367. Id.; see also Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760–61 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 368. See Morley, 175 F.3d at 760–61. 
 369. 320 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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investigator.370 In the subsequent civil rights action, he alleged that the 
prosecutor and investigator secretly taped exculpatory conversations that 
they suppressed, interfered with psychological evaluations of the 
plaintiff’s son, failed to interview witnesses, and prevented the son’s 
recantation of allegations that had been elicited in “fantasy therapy.”371 
The defendants asserted absolute and qualified immunity defenses, and 
the district court dismissed the action.372
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the plaintiff should have been 
granted leave to amend the complaint.373 After reviewing the current 
absolute immunity doctrine, the court concluded that, to resolve this 
issue, it was necessary to determine whether the misconduct occurred 
before or after probable cause existed.374 But because this determination 
required precise details about the chronology of events and the 
defendant’s subjective state of mind, the court remanded the case.375 
Specifically, the court indicated that the question of probable cause 
depends on the exact point in time that the defendant believed probable 
cause was met. As the court stated, 
[W]e cannot determine whether the alleged constitutional violations 
were committed before or after Ingram concluded that probable cause 
existed to arrest Broam and Manning. If these events occurred after 
probable cause existed to arrest Appellants, and Ingram and Bogan’s 
activities were quasi-judicial in nature, they would be protected by 
absolute immunity.376
Thus, the court concluded that the determination of probable cause 
depended on the exact chronology of events and the defendant’s 
subjective assessment of the evidence. 
The Broam case demonstrates the unworkability of the current 
absolute immunity doctrine. Determining the point at which probable 
cause existed in long-past criminal cases creates monumental proof 
problems. Discovery into and resolution of these fact questions will be 
protracted and expensive. And resolving the subjective state-of-mind 
question is even more problematic. The Court has rejected subjective 
 370. Id. at 1026–27. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. at 1025. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 1032–33. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 1033 (first emphasis added). 
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standards in its line of cases transforming qualified immunity from a 
good-faith standard to an objective standard.377 The whole point of the 
shift to an objective standard was to avoid a protracted inquiry that 
required extensive discovery into factual disputes that, in turn, prevented 
the resolution of the immunity question in the initial stages of the 
litigation.378
Perhaps seeking to avoid this subjective, state-of-mind issue, some 
courts have held that the determination of when probable cause exists is 
determined by an objective, after-the-fact analysis in the civil rights 
action. The Second Circuit has adopted an objective standard based on a 
reconstruction of the chronology of the criminal prosecution.379 In Hill v. 
City of New York,380 the plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor 
manufactured videotape evidence in a child abuse prosecution. The 
prosecutor contended that the videotapes at issue were made for 
submission to the grand jury and thus he was entitled to absolute 
immunity.381 The Second Circuit concluded that the issue did not turn on 
the prosecutor’s subjective state of mind.382 Rather, the court held that if 
the video was created before probable cause actually existed, then 
qualified immunity would apply, regardless of the prosecutor’s 
subjective state of mind.383 The court remanded the case for a 
determination of the factual issues with respect to the probable cause 
determination.384
Unfortunately, this approach presents nearly the same practical 
problems as the Ninth Circuit approach. How is the lower court to 
determine when probable cause objectively existed? Apparently, the 
precise chronology of the criminal prosecution must be reconstructed. 
This detailed reconstruction presents a daunting proof problem, 
especially given the passage of time in myriad cases in which people 
have been wrongly imprisoned for many years. Even if the record could 
be accurately reconstructed, the reconstruction will necessitate extensive 
discovery of the details of the investigation and will create inevitable 
 377. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815–18 (1982). 
 378. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–18. 
 379. See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 380. Id. at 656. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. at 662–63. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. at 663. 
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questions of fact as memories fade and evidence conflicts. Like the state-
of-mind issue, this approach generates factual disputes that preclude 
resolution of the immunity defense at the initial stage of the litigation and 
prevents the immunity defense from protecting the prosecutors, not just 
from liability, but also from the burden of litigation.385
Even assuming that this practical problem could be overcome, the 
approach seems inconsistent with the purpose of the absolute immunity 
doctrine. The purpose of absolute immunity is to ensure that the 
prosecutor acts with zeal and independence, freed from the threat of civil 
liability.386 But if the scope of the protection is not determined until 
years later by an after-the-fact, objective analysis of the complete 
criminal record, then how can this doctrine provide the prosecutor the 
peace of mind that is intended?387
In short, the Buckley probable cause approach offered the hope of a 
brightline test for determining whether a prosecutor was functioning as 
an investigator, administrator, or advocate. In practice, however, the 
Buckley probable cause requirement has generated confusion and conflict 
in the lower courts both as to when it applies and how it is to be 
established. Indeed, rather than providing an efficient test for 
determining whether absolute immunity applies, the Buckley probable 
cause requirement generates factual disputes that preclude the pretrial 
resolution of the immunity defense. 
4. Determining whether a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or 
advocate after probable cause has been met 
Assuming the courts can develop a satisfactory approach to the 
determination of when probable cause is required and when it is satisfied 
for purposes of the immunity defenses, they face another set of questions 
about the application of the immunity defenses after probable cause has 
been met.388 In Buckley, the Court held that pre-probable cause conduct 
 385. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815–18 (1982) (explaining that immunity defenses should be resolved at the earliest stages of the 
litigation to protect the defendant not just from liability but from the burden of litigation); see also 
infra notes 604–19 and accompanying text. 
 386. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423–25 (1976). 
 387. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987) (“An immunity that has as 
many variants as there are modes of official action and types of rights would not give conscientious 
officials that assurance of protection that it is the object of the doctrine to provide.”). 
 388. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1160–61. 
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is only protected by qualified immunity.389 But it recognized that post-
probable cause conduct might give rise to either qualified or absolute 
immunity, depending on the function being performed.390 Unfortunately, 
it gave no guidance to lower courts on how to determine whether a 
prosecutor is acting as an advocate or as an investigator after probable 
cause has been met.391
Not surprisingly, lower courts have reached conflicting decisions on 
post-probable cause immunity. The D.C. Circuit took a categorical 
approach in holding that coercing witnesses to testify falsely is an 
investigative function that receives only qualified immunity.392 On the 
other hand, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have recently held that the 
question is to be resolved by evaluating the subjective intent of the 
prosecutor at the time of the misconduct—whether she intended to act as 
an investigator or an advocate.393
Moore v. Valder.394 illustrates the first approach. After the plaintiff 
was acquitted on fraud charges,395 he filed a Bivens action alleging that 
the prosecutor had intimidated and coerced witnesses to testify falsely.396 
Applying the categorical approach to the immunity question, the D.C. 
Circuit held that intimidating and coercing witnesses was an 
investigatory function, not advocatory.397 The court explained that the 
prosecutor’s actions were “a misuse of investigative techniques 
legitimately directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful 
and complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating 
evidence. It therefore relates to a typical police function, the collection of 
information to be used in a prosecution.”398
In contrast to the Moore court’s position that witness coercion is 
categorically an investigative technique, the Fifth Circuit considers the 
subjective state of mind of the prosecutor at the time of the misconduct 
 389. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. 
 390. Id. at 274 n.5. 
 391. See McKenna, supra note 191, at 691; see also Rose, supra note 191, at 1044–46. 
 392. See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 393. See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 
F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); Broam v. 
Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 394. 65 F.3d 189. 
 395. Id. at 191. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. at 194. 
 398. Id. 
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to determine the function she was performing.399 In Cousin v. Small, the 
plaintiff alleged that prosecutors had coerced a witness to testify falsely, 
leading to his wrongful murder conviction.400 The Fifth Circuit 
considered the chronology of events and found that at the time of the 
misconduct the prosecutor was acting as an advocate, not as an 
investigator.401 The court reached this conclusion because “the interview 
was intended to secure evidence that would be used in the presentation of 
the state’s case at the pending trial of an already identified suspect, not to 
identify a suspect or establish probable cause.”402 In other words, the 
immunity that applies depends on the prosecutor’s subjective state of 
mind at the time of the misconduct. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a subjective state-of-mind 
test in three recent cases.403 For example, in Broam v. Bogan,404 the 
plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor and investigator improperly avoided 
interviewing exculpatory witnesses and withheld exculpatory evidence, 
including tape recordings. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for 
development of the factual chronology of events and for a determination 
of whether the prosecutor was acting as an investigator or as an 
advocate.405 As the court explained, the prosecutor is absolutely immune 
if he was gathering evidence to present to the trier of fact, but only 
protected by qualified immunity if he was conducting an investigation to 
determine whether probable cause existed.406 In other words, the 
prosecutor’s subjective intention determines which immunity applies.407
 399. Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 400. Id. at 629–31. 
 401. Id. at 635. 
 402. Id. (emphasis added). 
 403. See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 
F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 404. 320 F.3d at 1027–28. 
 405. Id. at 1034. 
 406. Id. at 1033. 
 407. See KRL, 384 F.3d 1105. In KRL, the court held that a question of fact was presented on 
the defendants’ purpose in securing a search warrant after probable cause had been met when the 
warrant went beyond legitimate preparation for trial on an existing indictment and sought to collect 
evidence of additional criminal activity. Id. at 1112. As the court explained, “A genuine issue of fact 
certainly exists as to the extent that the search warrant sought to gather evidence to prosecute 
[plaintiff] rather than to further the collateral investigation.” Id. Obviously, what the warrant “sought 
to gather” depends on the drafter’s intent in drafting the warrant, in other words, the subjective state 
of mind of the defendant. Moreover, in the mixed motive case in which the purpose is partly 
investigatory and partly advocatory, the Ninth Circuit concluded that to the extent the warrant served 
an investigative goal, qualified immunity applies, but to the extent it served an advocacy goal, 
absolute immunity applies. Id. The reconstruction of the events through notes and testimony and the 
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As explained above, injecting a subjective state-of-mind component 
into the immunity defenses is problematic.408 The Buckley Court 
cautioned against allowing prosecutors to obtain absolute immunity by 
claiming that investigative functions were for advocacy purposes,409 
which is exactly what this approach seems to invite. Moreover, this 
approach has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the line of cases that 
transformed qualified immunity from a good-faith standard to an 
objective standard.410 Subjective inquiries frustrate the goal of the 
immunity defense, which is to ensure the early disposition of the 
litigation.411 These inquiries lead to wide-ranging discovery that “can be 
peculiarly disruptive of effective government.”412
As the above discussion shows, the circuit courts are in conflict on a 
number of issues arising out of the current prosecutorial immunity 
doctrine. The Court could resolve these conflicts in either of two ways. 
First, the Court could take up a series of cases to answer these questions 
and resolve these conflicts. Alternatively, the Court could simplify the 
entire area of the law by eliminating absolute prosecutorial immunity and 
applying qualified immunity in all cases. The question is whether the 
benefits of the absolute immunity doctrine justify the complexity and 
confusion it introduces into the law. The following section addresses this 
assessment of prosecutorial intent based on this reconstruction required extensive factual discovery 
and presented complicated questions of fact. Id.; see also Genzler, 384 F.3d 1092. 
In another case, Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 F.3d 1092, the court held that witness interviews 
conducted after probable cause existed may serve either an investigative function or an advocatory 
function. Id. at 1099–1100. While the timing of evidence gathering is a relevant factor in 
determining function, it is not determinative. Id. at 1100. The court also focused on the nature of the 
meetings with witnesses. Id. at 1100–03. It looked at the defendants’ notes about the meetings to 
determine the defendants’ purpose in conducting the interviews and concluded that they 
were in the process of gathering information from [the witness] during the meeting and 
possibly encouraged her to lie as part of [the] process. There is little or nothing in the 
notes to indicate that the meeting focused on coaching [the witness] about how to present 
this information in a court proceeding. 
Id. at 1103. For this reason, the court concluded that the defendants were acting in an investigatory, 
not advocatory, capacity. Id. The court’s evaluation of the evidence reveals that it was trying to 
reconstruct the defendants’ states of mind at the time of the misconduct to determine whether the 
prosecutors were functioning as investigators or advocates for the purpose of determining which 
immunity applied. 
 408. See supra notes 182–86 and 369–85 and accompanying text. 
 409. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276. 
 410. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982). 
 411. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–18. 
 412. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817. 
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question and concludes that, ultimately, the benefits do not justify 
absolute immunity. 
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHOULD APPLY TO ALL CASES 
Since first adopting the prosecutorial immunity defense in civil rights 
actions, the Court has supported absolute prosecutorial immunity on 
historical and public policy grounds. But, as this discussion will show, 
the application of absolute immunity in prosecutorial misconduct cases 
misreads history and violates public policy. Qualified immunity should 
be uniformly applied in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. Qualified 
immunity is supported by both history and public policy. It provides 
protection for the honest prosecutor from the burden and intimidation of 
retaliatory litigation, while affording the victims a remedy where the 
prosecutor has intentionally violated clearly established constitutional 
guarantees. In addition, the uniform application of qualified immunity 
will eliminate the unnecessary confusion and complexity injected into 
civil rights litigation by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
Finally, although the doctrine of stare decisis properly curtails the casual 
overruling of precedent, when governing decisions prove to be both 
wrong and unworkable, the Court should and does correct its prior 
missteps.413
A. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Is Historically Unjustified 
As the Court has repeatedly explained, immunities apply in § 1983 
actions because the Court has concluded that Congress did not intend to 
erase established common-law immunities when it adopted § 1983.414 
For this reason, the Court’s starting point for analyzing an immunity 
question under § 1983 is the state of the law of immunities in 1871 when 
§ 1983 was adopted.415 Thus, in the Court’s view, since legislators and 
judges had absolute immunity in 1871, these immunities were 
retained.416
 413. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827–28 (1991). 
 414. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268; Burns v. Reed, 
500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–18 (1976). 
 415. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484; Imbler, 424 
U.S. at 417–18. 
 416. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (finding that absolute immunity applied to 
judges in 1871); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–76 (1951) (finding that absolute 
immunity applied to legislators in 1871). But see J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the 
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But the 1871 common law with respect to prosecutorial immunity is 
more difficult to establish than legislative or judicial immunity for two 
reasons. First, in 1871, the office of public prosecutor as we know it 
today did not exist in most states.417 Second, the first United States case 
recognizing any form of immunity for a public prosecutor was decided 
twenty-five years after § 1983 was adopted.418 This section will review 
the common-law landscape of 1871 and explain why absolute 
prosecutorial immunity cannot be justified by reference to history. 
In 1871, the United States’ criminal justice system bore little 
resemblance to the system we know today. In the English common-law 
system, criminal prosecutions were primarily brought by the victim’s 
family and friends,419 and the American system developed in part out of 
History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 899; John C. Filosa, Note, Prosecutorial 
Immunity: No Place for Absolutes, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 980–81 (noting that of the thirty-seven 
states in the Union as of 1871, only a minority of them had absolute judicial immunity at the time; 
the Sparkman Court cited to those thirteen states that had absolute immunity and ignored the twenty-
four others that did not have absolute immunity.); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 
1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 323–28 (1969) (stating that the assumption of common-law immunity is 
wrong because the common law in the United States in 1871 did not clearly require absolute judicial 
immunity: “[A] diligent congressman, looking to the federal rule in 1871, would have had no reason 
not to surmise that an incorrect ruling of law, maliciously made, which deprived an individual of his 
constitutional rights, would probably subject the offending judge to liability.”). 
 417. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11 (citing Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 100–02 (1976); John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public 
Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 316 (1973)). 
 418. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896) (holding that a prosecutor was entitled to 
absolute immunity); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); McKenna, supra note 191, at 668 n.36. 
 419. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 
47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 515–16 (1994); Andrew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept of 
Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754, 756 (1976). As one American court explained, “In an 
early day in England private parties prosecuted criminal wrongs which they suffered. They obtained 
an indictment from a grand jury, and it became the duty and the privilege of the person injured to 
provide a prosecutor at his own expense to prosecute the indicted person.” State v. Peterson, 218 
N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928), quoted in Bessler, supra, at 520 n.34. While law officers of the crown 
could and did regularly prosecute, these were extraordinary cases, and not the normal process except 
in matters touching the interest of political authorities. Langbein, supra note 417, at 315–16. Indeed, 
historically, prosecutors in most felony cases were not lawyers, but victims. Id. at 316–18. And later, 
when private prosecutors retained solicitors, the private prosecutor retained control to manage the 
prosecution just as a private litigant would manage a civil case. Thomas J. Robinson, Jr., Private 
Prosecution in Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 300, 302 (1968). Since the private 
prosecutor often had a stake in the litigation, revenge was often a primary motivating factor for the 
prosecution. Bessler, supra, at 515 n.13. But since the private prosecutor did not need to have any 
interest in the litigation, the motivation may well have been not justice, but financial gain from 
rewards offered by victims or their families or from fines that were shared between the crown and 
the prosecutor. Robinson, supra, at 302–03. Indeed, Blackstone observed that prosecutions were 
motivated for financial reasons, not to achieve social justice since defendants were often allowed to 
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this tradition.420 But even before the Revolutionary War, the colonies 
had begun replacing private prosecutions with public prosecutions.421 
Yet well into the nineteenth century, and despite the official 
establishment of public prosecutors’ offices, the private prosecution of 
crimes remained a significant feature of the American criminal justice 
system.422 For example, in Pennsylvania, private prosecutions were 
common.423 Thus, “[p]arents of young women prosecuted men for 
seduction; husbands prosecuted their wives’ paramours for adultery; 
wives prosecuted their husbands for desertion.”424 In this system, the 
victims and their families often retained private lawyers to prosecute the 
perpetrators of crimes against them.425 Obviously, in this tradition 
prosecutors had a personal stake in the outcome and were far from 
detached and unbiased participants in the process. As one commenter 
observed, “At common law criminal prosecution adhered to the pure 
pay complainants before judgment was entered. 2 William BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *364, 
cited in Sidman, supra, at 760 n.43. But even in the case of public prosecutors, a financial incentive 
often was provided for convictions. See Meares, supra note 123, at 880–81. For example, in 
California in 1887, prosecutors received $15 for each conviction. Id. at 881 n.109. To put this in 
perspective, $15 in 1887 would have been worth $293 in 2003. The Inflation Calculator, at 
http://www.westegg.com/ 
inflation/infl.cgi (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). Similarly, in 1866 in Tennessee, the district attorney 
general received $10 for each felony conviction and $20 for each death penalty conviction. Meares, 
supra note 123, at 881 n.109. Adjusted for inflation, $10 in 1886 would have been worth $114 in 
2003, and $20 in 1886 would have been worth $228 in 2003. The Inflation Calculator, at 
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
 420. Bessler, supra note 419, at 515; Sidman, supra note 419, at 756. 
 421. Bessler, supra note 419, at 516; Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of 
Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43 (1995); Sidman, supra 
note 419, at 762. The origins of the American public prosecutor are traced to several European 
traditions—English, French, and Dutch—but its exact heritage is an “historical enigma.” Bessler, 
supra note 419, at 517; see also Robinson, supra note 419, at 308–311 (explaining the Dutch, 
Scottish, and French influence on the adoption of the public prosecutor’s office in the colonies); W. 
Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., The District Attorney—A Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 128–37 
(exploring the Dutch influence on the development of the public prosecutor in America). 
 422. Bessler, supra note 419, at 518; Ireland, supra note 421, at 43. 
 423. Bessler, supra note 419, at 518. “Private prosecution—one citizen taking another to court 
without the intervention of the police—was the basis of law enforcement in Philadelphia and an 
anchor of its legal culture, and this had been so since colonial times.” Id. at 518 n.26 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 25 (1989)). 
 424. Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting STEINBERG, supra note 423, at 48). 
As Bessler notes, “Some private prosecutions in Philadelphia bordered on the bizarre. For example, 
‘Henry Blake’s wife prosecuted him for refusing to come to bed when called and making too much 
noise, preventing her from sleeping. He was bound over to come to bed when called.’” Id., at 518 
n.28 (quoting STEINBERG, supra note 423, at 57). 
 425. Ireland, supra note 421, at 45–46. 
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form of the adversary system; each aggrieved party retained his own 
counsel to prosecute his private interest.”426
The persistence of the private prosecutor in the United States in the 
nineteenth century after the establishment of public prosecutors’ offices 
has been explained by two main factors. First, because of inadequate 
funding of the office, public prosecutors were often incompetent.427 
According to one delegate at the Illinois Constitutional Convention in 
1847, “The [public prosecutor’s] office was generally taken by young 
men who desired to become acquainted with people, and get into 
practice; as soon as this was accomplished they gave way to others.”428 
This view was expressed in many other jurisdictions as well.429 Second, 
public prosecutors were responsible for covering vast territories, often 
without any assistants, which compounded their incompetence.430 
Traveling from county to county, the public prosecutor was often 
unprepared for the litigation, unfamiliar with the jury pool, and 
outmatched by defense counsel.431 As one delegate to the 1890–91 
Kentucky Constitutional Convention explained, the public prosecutor 
was “a rat in a strange garret.”432 Under these circumstances, victims and 
their families hired private lawyers to handle criminal prosecutions in the 
hope of securing convictions.433 Throughout the nineteenth century, 
private prosecution flourished in most states.434
 426. John A. J. Ward, Note, Private Prosecution—The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV. 
1171, 1171 (1972). 
 427. Ireland, supra note 421, at 43–44. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. at 44. The same criticism was expressed in Kentucky, Maryland, Kansas, Nebraska, 
and Florida. Id. 
 430. Id. at 44–45. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. at 45. 
 433. Id. 45–46. 
 434. Id. 48–49. Specifically, private prosecution had been officially approved in Alabama, 
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. at 49. North Carolina has also acknowledged that 
private prosecution “is deeply rooted in North Carolina practice.” State v. Best, 186 S.E.2d 1, 3 
(N.C. 1974); see also Ward, supra note 426, at 1171. To be sure, the system had its critics who 
feared that the criminal defendant’s rights were prejudiced and who believed a public prosecutor was 
necessary to ensure the integrity of the process. Ireland, supra note 421, at 47–48; Ward, supra note 
426, at 1172–73. A few state courts—specifically, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin—
condemned the practice. Bessler, supra note 419, at 519–20. But the practice persisted well into the 
twentieth century. In 1987, exercising its supervisory authority over federal courts, the United States 
Supreme Court criticized the practice. Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 806–08 (1987). But, as 
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While the office of public prosecutor was not well established in the 
late nineteenth century, the tort of malicious prosecution was clearly 
recognized in both the English and American common law.435 The 
elements of the action were: (1) that the prosecution terminated in favor 
of the plaintiff; (2) that there was no probable cause; and (3) that the 
defendant acted with malice.436 Although there was no prosecutorial 
immunity defense at the time, the elements of a cause of action for 
malicious prosecution essentially allowed for the same result as qualified 
immunity, since the plaintiff was required to prove malice and lack of 
probable cause.437 As explained in Blackstone’s Commentaries, these 
requirements were necessary, “[f]or it would be a very great 
discouragement to the public justice of the kingdom if prosecutors, who 
had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law 
whenever their indictments miscarried.”438
And throughout the century, while malicious prosecution actions 
were frequently brought against the parties who pressed criminal charges 
arising out of a personal dispute,439 the lawyers privately retained to 
of 1991, the high courts or legislatures of thirty states still approved some form of involvement of 
private prosecutors in criminal prosecutions. Ireland, supra note 421, at 55. 
 435. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, LAW OF TORTS 195 (1875) (explaining that the leading English 
case of this period, Savile v. Roberts, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K.B. 1698), required plaintiff to prove 
malice and lack of probable cause); Schillaci, supra note 140, at 443–45. 
 436. Vanderbilt v. Mathis, 5 Duer 304 (N.Y. 1856); Steward v. Gromett, 7 Common Bench 
Reports, New Series, 191 (Common Pleas 1859), reported in JAMES B. AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, 1 
THE LAW OF TORTS 573 (3d ed. 1910); FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 249 (2d ed. 
1908); THOMAS M. COOLEY, ELEMENTS OF TORTS 53–54 (1895). 
 437. See BURDICK, supra note 436, at 132–33. As Justice Scalia observed, “There was, of 
course, no such thing as absolute prosecutorial immunity when § 1983 was adopted.” Id. at 132; see 
also BURDICK, supra note 436, at 249–62; Eugene Scalia, Police Witness Immunity Under §1983, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1433, 1441–42 (1989); Schillaci, supra note 140, at 445. 
 438. BLACKSTONE, supra note 419, at *126. 
 439. See Field v. Ireland, 21 Ala. 240 (1852) (approving a malicious prosecution action 
against defendant for prosecuting plaintiff for theft of goods); Long v. Rodgers, 19 Ala. 321 (1851) 
(recognizing a malicious prosecution action against father for charging plaintiff with unlawfully 
taking his daughter); Collins v. Fowler, 10 Ala. 858 (1846) (affirming a malicious prosecution action 
against defendant for charging plaintiff with stealing two bales of cotton); Stone v. Stevens, 12 
Conn. 219 (1837) (affirming a malicious prosecution action against former employer who charged 
plaintiff with stealing cloth); Bourne v. Stout, 62 Ill. 261 (1871) (upholding a jury verdict in a 
malicious prosecution action against defendant for charging plaintiff with stealing a horse); 
Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 Ill. 512 (1869) (affirming a malicious prosecution action after a landlord-
tenant dispute led to charges that the tenant had made death threats); Ross v. Innis, 35 Ill. 487 (1864) 
(affirming a malicious prosecution action against former employer for charging employee with 
embezzlement); Jacks v. Stimpson, 13 Ill. 702 (1852) (reversing a malicious prosecution action 
against defendant for charging plaintiff with cattle theft because the instructions indicated that 
defendant’s belief in the plaintiff’s guilt satisfied probable cause); Shaul v. Brown, 28 Iowa 37 
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prosecute crimes could also be held liable.440 For example, an 1845 
Kentucky case held that an attorney could be held liable for malicious 
prosecution for leading a lay justice of the peace into issuing a wrongful 
order for the sheriff to seize the plaintiff’s dwelling.441 As the court 
(1869) (affirming a malicious prosecution action against defendant for charges that plaintiff stole a 
puppy); Faris v. Starke, 42 Ky. 4 (1842) (reversing a malicious prosecution action against defendant 
for charging plaintiff with breaking into his store and stealing property because the evidence 
required a new trial); Kimball v. Bates, 50 Me. 308 (1862) (reversing a malicious prosecution action 
against defendant who instituted criminal proceedings to coerce plaintiff to surrender promissory 
notes based on the evidence); Varrell v. Holmes, 4 Me. 168 (1826) (affirming a nonsuit in a 
malicious prosecution action against defendant who instituted criminal charges arising out of land 
dispute because the plaintiff failed to show want of probable cause); Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 194 
(1872) (affirning a judgment for defendant in a malicious prosecution action against a bank cashier 
for charging plaintiff with trying to pass a forged check because the evidence failed to establish 
malice); Laird v. Taylor, 66 Barb. 139 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1868) (affirming a malicious prosecution 
verdict against defendant for charging plaintiff with theft of horse reins); Grinnel v. Stewart, 32 
Barb. 544 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860) (setting aside the dismissal of a malicious prosecution action 
against defendant for charging that plaintiff obtained property by false pretenses); Schonfield v. 
Ferrer, 47 Pa. 194 (1864) (revising a malicious prosecution judgment because the judge failed to 
instruct the jury on the malice requirement in an action against defendant for charging plaintiff with 
horse theft in order to coerce the return of the horse); Prough v. Entriken, 11 Pa. 81 (1849) 
(reversing a malicious prosecution judgment for instructional error in an action against defendant 
who had plaintiff arrested on fraud charges and then extorted money from him while he was in 
prison); French v. Smith, 4 Vt. 363 (1827) (reversing a malicious prosecution case because of juror 
prejudice in an action against defendant for charging plaintiff with the theft of a scale). 
 440. Warfield v. Campbell, 35 Ala. 349 (1859) (holding that an attorney who caused plaintiff 
to be arrested and imprisoned with malice and without probable cause could be held liable for 
malicious prosecution); Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 536, 538–40 (1852) (holding that an attorney who 
caused the wrongful imprisonment of plaintiff in civil action could be held liable for malicious 
prosecution); Wood v. Weir, 44 Ky. 544 (1845) (holding that an attorney could be held liable for 
malicious prosecution for maliciously inducing a justice of the peace to issue a wrongful order for 
the seizure of plaintiff’s house); Staley v. Turner 21 Mo. App. 244, 251–52 (1886) (holding that an 
attorney who joined with his client in bringing a criminal action with malice and without probable 
cause is liable for malicious prosecution). According to the court in Staley, in such cases, the client 
and the attorney are legally in the same position but 
from the standpoint of sound morals, it is infinitely worse, for he prostitutes the privileges 
which the state has conferred upon him of appearing in its courts as an officer of those 
courts and a minister of justice. The client may, indeed, in many cases, excuse his 
motives by proving that he acted under the advice of his counsel, but no such refuge is 
left open to the attorney. He is learned in the law and knows the ground whereon he 
stands. 
Id. at 251; see McKenna, supra note 191, at 668–69 n.36 (citing a nineteenth-century treatise, 
MARTIN L. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL 
PROCESS (1892), which “provided that prosecutors were liable if there were malice and absence of 
probable cause, with no distinction made between public and private prosecutors”). 
 441. Wood, 44 Ky. at 544. 
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explained, justices of the peace rely on counsel to prepare proper 
orders:442
It would be strange, therefore, if the attorney, by art and contrivance, 
the abuse of the confidence reposed, and prostitution of his profession, 
should procure from the Justices, from malicious motives to the 
defendant, an illegal and oppressive order by which injury accrues to 
the defendant, if the attorney could not be made liable for the wrong. It 
is contended, that this rule will expose attorneys to perplexing 
litigation, to the manifest injury of the profession. If it should, the law 
knows no distinction of persons; a different rule cannot, as to them, be 
recognized by this Court, from that which is applicable to others. 
Besides, this is a numerous class, powerful for good or evil, and 
holding them to a strict accountability, will have the effect to exalt and 
dignify the profession, by purging it of ignorant, meretricious and 
reckless members.443
While the actual decisions are few, case law predating 1871 suggests 
that public prosecutors were equally liable for prosecutorial misconduct. 
Specifically, an 1854 Massachusetts decision, Parker v. Huntington,444 
held that public prosecutors could be liable for malicious prosecution. In 
Parker, the plaintiff alleged that the district attorney maliciously 
contrived with another to elicit testimony from the plaintiff during a 
grand jury proceeding that could later be used to indict him for 
perjury.445 He further alleged that the prosecutor used false testimony to 
indict and convict him of perjury.446 The defendants demurred on the 
grounds that the action failed to establish a conspiracy.447 The court 
overruled the demurrer, holding that, although an action for malicious 
prosecution had historically required conspiracy allegations, that element 
was no longer required.448 As the court explained, “The plaintiff can 
maintain his case by proof of a malicious prosecution by both or either of 
the defendants.”449 In other words, the plaintiff stated a malicious 
prosecution cause of action against the public prosecutor simply by 
 442. Id. at 546–47. 
 443. Id. at 547. 
 444. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854); see also McKenna, supra note 191, at 668–69 n.36. 
 445. Id. at 125. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. at 126. 
 448. Id. at 126–28. 
 449. Id. 
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alleging that he elicited and used false testimony in a criminal 
prosecution.450
Thus, a hypothetical legislator in 1871 conscientiously researching 
the common law on the eve of the passage of § 1983 would have found 
the well-established tort of malicious prosecution,451 which had been 
upheld in an action against a public prosecutor for eliciting and using 
false testimony.452 Additionally, he would have found no immunity 
defense to insulate the prosecutor from liability if the elements of the 
cause of action were proven, for there was not a single decision affording 
prosecutors any kind of immunity defense from liability for malicious 
prosecution.453 Nothing in the existing common law would have 
suggested to our legislator that after the adoption of § 1983 prosecutors 
would escape liability for malicious prosecution under the shield of a 
totally novel doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity that had never 
been recognized in the common law. 
Indeed, far from being a “well-settled” doctrine in 1871,454 there is 
not one single case adopting any form of prosecutorial immunity until 
many years later. Instead the defense of prosecutorial immunity 
developed two to three decades after the adoption of § 1983 as the office 
of the public prosecutor developed,455 but the courts split on whether 
absolute or qualified immunity applied.456 The first case, Griffith v. 
Slinkard,457 was decided in 1896, twenty-five years after § 1983 was 
enacted.458 In Griffith, the Indiana Supreme Court shielded the district 
attorney with absolute immunity no matter how malicious his motives.459 
 450. The court did suggest that the action was deficient for other reasons, citing two previous 
cases. Parker, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 128 (citing Parker v. Farley, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 279 (1852); 
Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 217 (1849)). But the defect in both these cases was the failure to 
sufficiently allege the criminal prosecution had terminated in the plaintiff’s favor and was unrelated 
to the question of liability of a public prosecutor. Parker, 64 Mass. (2 Gray) at 280–81; Bacon, 58 
Mass. (4 Cush.) at 235. 
 451. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 452. Parker, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 124. 
 453. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 454. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976). 
 455. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11. 
 456. Note, The Civil Liability of a District Attorney for Quasi-Judicial Acts, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 
300, 304–07 (1925). 
 457. 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896). 
 458. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421. 
 459. Griffith, 44 N.E. 1001. In Griffith, the plaintiff alleged that the elected prosecuting 
attorney had maliciously and wrongfully sought an indictment against him before the grand jury and 
had wrongfully inserted his name into the indictment, even though the grand jury had decided not to 
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But the very next year, a Kentucky case indicated that prosecutors could 
be held liable for malicious prosecution if they acted with malice or 
corrupt motives.460 This split remained for roughly the next twenty-five 
years.461
For example, in 1908 the Supreme Court of California held that a 
complaint stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution against the 
district attorney by alleging that he had conspired with the deputy district 
attorney and sheriff to falsely charge the plaintiff with a crime and that 
he had convicted the plaintiff by procuring false evidence and 
intimidating the jury.462 The defendants contended no action would lie 
because the plaintiff had been convicted, and thus probable cause had 
been met.463 The court rejected this argument stating: 
Certainly, if a man has procured an unjust judgment by the knowing 
use of false and perjured testimony, he has perpetrated a great private 
wrong against his adversary. If that judgment is in the form of a 
judgment of criminal conviction, it would be obnoxious to every one’s 
sense of right and justice to say that, because the infamy had been 
successful to the result of a conviction, the probable cause for the 
prosecution was thus conclusively established against a man who had 
thus been doubly wronged.464
return an indictment against him. Id. at 1001. The defendant thereafter caused him to be arrested 
through a warrant issued based on the indictment. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of a demurrer on the ground that the prosecuting attorney was acting as a judicial 
officer and was therefore entitled to immunity, even though he acted maliciously. Id. at 1002. The 
court also sustained the demurrer to a defamation action against the prosecutor arising from the 
reading of the indictment. Id. 
 460. Arnold v. Hubble, 38 S.W. 1041 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897). 
 461. Note, supra note 456, at 304–07. Compare Carpenter v. Sibley, 94 P. 879 (Cal. 1908) 
(upholding action against sheriff and district attorney for malicious prosecution), Leong Yau v. 
Carden, 23 Haw. 362 (1916) (holding that prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity when acting 
within the scope of his authority), Schneider v. Shephard 158 N.W. 182 (Mich. 1916) (holding 
prosecutor was not entitled to immunity), State v. Brinkman, 175 N.W. 1005 (Minn. 1920) (holding 
that malicious prosecution action would lie when prosecutor acted with malice and without probable 
cause), and Skeffington v. Eylward, 105 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1906) (upholding verdict against 
prosecutor for malicious prosecution), with Smith v. Parman, 165 P. 663 (Kan. 1917) (holding that 
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity), Kittler v. Kelsch, 216 N.W. 898 (N.D. 1927) (holding the 
state prosecutor was absolutely immune for his decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence for a 
criminal prosecution), Price v. Cook, 250 P. 519 (Okla. 1926) (holding that public prosecutor enjoys 
absolute immunity), and Watts v. Gerking, 222 P. 318 (Or. 1924) (holding prosecutor immune from 
malicious prosecution action when performing his official duty). 
 462. Carpenter, 94 P. at 879–80. 
 463. Id. 
 464. Id. at 880. 
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For this reason, the court upheld the plaintiff’s right to proceed in the tort 
action against the prosecutor who had procured the false testimony.465
Similarly, in 1924 the Supreme Court of Oregon refused to grant a 
prosecutor absolute immunity.466 While the court recognized the need to 
give prosecutors sufficient breathing room to exercise their discretion,467 
it stated: 
But from this it does not follow that a district attorney is not to be held 
accountable in a civil action for damages at the suit of an injured party 
for maliciously causing the arrest of such party for a pretended offense, 
which, at the time of the arrest, he knew had not been committed at all; 
for in such case the district attorney is not acting in the line of his duty 
or within the scope of his authority.468
While the state decisions on the immunity or liability of a public 
prosecutor were in conflict from 1896 to 1927, federal law also offered 
no resolution of the question during this period. The Supreme Court did 
not address the question of whether a public prosecutor would enjoy 
absolute or qualified immunity until 1927—fifty-six years after § 1983 
was adopted.469 In that decision, the Court held that absolute immunity 
applied.470 But obviously this decision does not support the conclusion 
that absolute prosecutorial immunity was established in the common law 
fifty years earlier when the 1871 Congress enacted § 1983. 
In short, since prosecutors did not enjoy absolute immunity in 1871, 
the Court’s historical justification for adopting it in §1983 actions is 
unfounded. Indeed, in the opinion of some justices, the absence of a 
common-law tradition of absolute immunity precludes its recognition 
today.471 Specifically, in Justice Scalia’s view, although a common-law 
tradition of absolute immunity is not a sufficient condition for adopting 
the doctrine, it is a necessary one.472 As he explains, the Court’s “role is 
to interpret the intent of [the 1871] Congress in enacting § 1983, not to 
 465. Id. 
 466. Watts, 222 P. at 322. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 322–23. 
 469. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). 
 470. Id. 
 471. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493–94 (1991). 
 472. Burns, 500 U.S. at 497–98 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 279–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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make a freewheeling policy choice.”473 Moreover, qualified immunity is 
presumed to apply, and “the defendant bears the burden of showing that 
the conduct for which he seeks immunity would have been privileged at 
common law in 1871.”474 Thus if the common law is unclear, the 
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity—not absolute immunity.475 
Under this approach, since the common-law doctrine of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity is at best unclear and, in fact, lacking any support 
in case law, it should not have been recognized in § 1983 actions. 
Instead of denying absolute prosecutorial immunity based on the 
common law of 1871, the Imbler Court misread the 1871 common law 
and erroneously concluded that prosecutors enjoyed absolute 
immunity.476 As discussed above,477 the Imbler Court found that at 
common law, prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity for the same policy 
reasons that judges and legislators were shielded by immunity.478 
Indeed, the Court concluded that this immunity was “well settled.”479 
But the Court cited no precedent recognizing prosecutorial immunity 
before 1871. And as the following discussion will show, the Court’s 
initial conclusions about the 1871 common law were unfounded since 
none of the 1871 common-law immunities afforded prosecutors absolute 
immunity.480
For purposes of this Article, there were three relevant immunities in 
1871: judicial, quasi-judicial, and defamation. First, judicial immunity 
extended both to public officials and to private citizens who were 
 473. Burns, 500 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)); see also Buckley, 
509 U.S. at 268. 
 474. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 475. Id. 
 476. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421–24 (1976). 
 477. See supra Part IV.A. 
 478. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–24. 
 479. Id. at 424. 
 480. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123–27 (1997), in which the Supreme Court 
recognized that its prior decisions had “granted a broader immunity to public prosecutors than had 
been available in malicious prosecution actions against private persons who brought prosecutions at 
early common law.” Id. at 124 n.11. The Court explained that “these early cases were decided before 
the office of public prosecutor in its modern form was common,” and since the office of public 
prosecutor was established, “the availability of malicious prosecution actions has been curtailed.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1988)). For 
these reasons, the Court observed: “[T]he Court in Imbler drew guidance both from the first 
American cases addressing the availability of malicious prosecution actions against public 
prosecutors, and perhaps more importantly, from the policy considerations underlying the firmly 
established common-law rules providing absolute immunity for judges and jurors.” Id. 
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involved in resolving disputes, including “judges, jurors and grand 
jurors, members of courts martial, private arbitrators, and various 
assessors and commissioners.”481 As Justice Scalia has explained, “[T]he 
touchstone for its applicability was performance of the function of 
resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating 
private rights.”482 It precluded civil liability even where the defendant 
acted in bad faith and with malice.483 It was adopted to ensure that those 
resolving disputes would act independently and without fear of 
consequences.484 The Court explained in adopting the absolute judicial 
immunity doctrine in 1872: 
[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper 
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the 
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, 
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to 
answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of 
the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, 
and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be 
either respectable or useful. As observed by a distinguished English 
judge, it would establish the weakness of judicial authority in a 
degrading responsibility.485
But absolute judicial immunity was not extended to prosecutors, who 
were liable for malicious prosecution if they acted unreasonably and in 
bad faith.486
Using a functional approach, judicial immunity would not apply to 
today’s public prosecutors since they function as advocates, not 
independent adjudicators responsible for resolving disputes.487 Indeed, 
the current law of absolute prosecutorial immunity is limited to the 
 481. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499–500 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McKenna, supra note 191, at 666 n.22; 
see also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW 361–62 (1889); 
BURDICK, supra note 436, at 30–31. 
 482. Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 483. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1966); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872). 
 484. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stump, 435 
U.S. at 349; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. 
 485. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347; see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. 
 486. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra notes 435–50 and cases cited 
therein. 
 487. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132. 
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advocacy functions of the prosecutor.488 This advocacy role is not at all 
analogous to the impartial dispute-resolution function protected by 
judicial immunity as it existed in 1871, but is closely analogous to the 
role of the private prosecutor who could be sued for malicious 
prosecution.489
Second, quasi-judicial immunity applied to public officials engaged 
in official acts involving policy decisions.490 It applied where the law 
“commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon 
them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion in 
its nature judicial.”491 For example, quasi-judicial immunity protected a 
tax assessor determining liability,492 a school board expelling a 
student,493 a town board of equalization determining land value,494 a 
court clerk,495 and a surveyor-general.496 This immunity would seem 
applicable to the function of the modern public prosecutor who performs 
government functions requiring the exercise of discretion.497 But quasi-
judicial immunity was a qualified immunity requiring good faith and thus 
provides no historical support for granting prosecutors absolute 
immunity.498
Finally, absolute defamation immunity applied to all statements 
made in court proceedings.499 It shielded judges, jurors, witnesses, and 
 488. Id. at 125; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993). 
 489. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring). As Justice Scalia points out, at common 
law prosecutors enjoyed no immunity, but the elements of malicious prosecution essentially gave the 
prosecutor the same protection that qualified immunity would have provided since good faith would 
defeat the required malice element. Id. 
 490. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see BISHOP, supra note 481, at 365–66; BURDICK, supra 
note 436, at 35–36. 
 491. BISHOP, supra note 481, at 365; see also H. GERALD CHAPIN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS 150 (1917); COOLEY, supra note 436, at 161. 
 492. BISHOP, supra note 481, at 366 (citing Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547, 559 (1809); 
Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846)). 
 493. Id. (citing Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1848)). 
 494. Id. (citing Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 393 (1870)). 
 495. Billings v. Lafferty, 31 Ill. 318, 322 (1863). 
 496. Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, 44–52 (1854). 
 497. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 
U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 498. Burns, 500 U.S. at 500–01 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
BISHOP, supra note 481, at 366; BURDICK, supra note 436, at 36. 
 499. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133; see also BISHOP, supra note 481, at 123–25. 
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lawyers.500 Like judicial immunity, defamation immunity protected 
defendants from liability even where they acted with bad faith.501 The 
purpose of defamation immunity was to protect the public interest in the 
judicial function by ensuring that the participants would not fear being 
sued for their involvement.502 But this immunity applied only to 
defamation actions and did not extend to malicious prosecution suits.503 
Thus, applying this immunity today would insulate prosecutors in 
defamation actions brought based on testimony elicited in court,504 but it 
would not bar actions for due process violations, including fabricating 
evidence, suppressing exculpatory evidence, coercing witnesses, or other 
nontestimonial misconduct resulting in wrongful convictions. 
In short, the common law of immunities in 1871 simply does not 
support the Imbler Court’s conclusion that the advocacy function 
performed by today’s public prosecutor would have enjoyed absolute 
common-law immunity. Rather, if 1871 immunity law were applied to 
today’s prosecutor, she would enjoy absolute defamation immunity for 
testimony elicited in court, but only qualified immunity for other 
advocacy functions. 
Moreover, even assuming that the 1871 Congress intended to retain 
the common law in adopting § 1983 and assuming that prosecutors 
enjoyed absolute immunity under that common law, this does not 
necessarily justify retaining absolute prosecutorial immunity today. The 
1871 Congress presumably understood the common law system. This is 
the assumption the Court made in concluding Congress intended to retain 
common law immunities.505 So presumably, Congress also knew that the 
common law evolved. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., explained: 
 500. Burns, 500 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 n.23 (1976); BISHOP, supra note 481, at 123–25 (noting that 
for remarks of counsel to be privileged they must be pertinent to the issue); James P. Kenner, Note, 
Prosecutorial Immunity: Removal of the Shield Destroys the Effectiveness of the Sword, 33 
WASHBURN L.J. 402, 405–06 (1994). 
 501. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133; see also BISHOP, supra note 481, at 124–25. 
 502. See BISHOP, supra note 481, at 124–25. 
 503. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns, 500 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Kenner, supra note 500, at 406. 
 504. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 505. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Burns, 
500 U.S. at 484; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–18. As the Court explained, “the presumed legislative 
intent not to eliminate the traditional immunities is our only justification for limiting the categorical 
language of the statute.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 498. 
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The life of the [common] law has not been logic: it has been 
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and 
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, 
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had 
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by 
which men should be governed. . . . The very considerations which 
judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret 
root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, 
consideration of what is expedient for the community concerned.506
Given this adaptive system and the Court’s conclusion that the 1871 
Congress acted “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities 
and defenses,”507 nothing in the text of § 1983 or its legislative history 
supports the view that Congress intended the existing immunity doctrines 
to be frozen for eternity as they existed in 1871. Assuming Congress 
intended to preserve the common law, it intended to preserve an evolving 
system of judicial decisionmaking, responsive to historic, economic, 
social, and institutional developments, not rigid rules set for all time in 
1871 concrete. 
This common law evolution is exactly what has happened to the 
common-law doctrine of qualified immunity.508 The Court has candidly 
recognized that the common-law doctrine that existed in 1871 has proven 
unsatisfactory in contemporary times.509 For this reason, the Court has 
transformed the common-law quasi-judicial immunity doctrine from a 
subjective good-faith standard to an objective standard based on clearly 
established law.510 In doing so, the Court frankly rejected the 1871 
doctrine and overruled prior precedents applying a subjective 
standard.511 The Court is similarly obligated to revise the absolute 
immunity doctrine if it proves unsuited to contemporary needs and 
policies.512
In other words, even assuming that the Court was right about 
Congress’s intent to preserve the common law and about the existence of 
 506. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1, 35 (1881). 
 507. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. 
 508. See infra notes 601–16 and accompanying text. 
 509. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982). 
 510. Id. 
 511. See id. 
 512. Justice Scalia has distinguished the Court’s role in expanding and redefining qualified 
immunity from its authority to expand absolute immunity. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 n.1 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my view, the distinction is valid but 
inapplicable when the argument is that absolute immunity should be restricted rather than expanded. 
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absolute prosecutorial immunity in 1871, that still would not justify 
adherence to that doctrine if it were ill-suited to contemporary needs. 
History alone—even accurate history—is a poor justification for 
retaining an unjust and unworkable common-law rule. As Justice Holmes 
observed:  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.513
In determining immunities under § 1983, the Court has repeatedly 
explained that the common law of 1871 is the starting point for analysis. 
But as this section has shown, absolute prosecutorial immunity did not 
exist in 1871. The Imbler Court was mistaken in its analysis of the 
analogous 1871 common-law immunities with respect to prosecutorial 
functions. And if the 1871 Congress intended to retain the common law, 
that does not mean it intended to adopt an immutable rule of immunity in 
place of the case-by-case evolution of the common law. The historical 
argument for absolute prosecutorial immunity is simply unsupportable. 
B. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Violates Public Policy 
In developing the immunity defenses available in § 1983 actions, the 
Court considers both historic foundations and contemporary public 
policy.514 This section focuses on how absolute prosecutorial immunity 
violates public policy in several important ways. First, absolute 
prosecutorial immunity undermines the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. Second, it denies any remedy to the victims of the egregious 
abuse of government power. Third, it eliminates the needed deterrent 
effect that a civil remedy would provide, especially since other checks on 
prosecutorial misconduct are ineffective. Fourth, it hinders the 
development of constitutional law and the implementation of structural 
remedies to systemic problems. Fifth, absolute immunity is not necessary 
to protect honest prosecutors from vexatious litigation since the 
requirements for proving a cause of action and the defense of qualified 
immunity are sufficient to eliminate unmeritorious cases. And finally, 
absolute prosecutorial immunity introduces unnecessary complexity, 
confusion, and conflict into the law. 
 513. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 514. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424–29 (1976). 
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1. Absolute immunity undermines the integrity of the criminal  
justice system 
The public prosecutor has a unique role in our criminal justice 
system. One former attorney general observed that “[t]he prosecutor has 
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America.”515 Because of this vast power, the prosecutor has special 
responsibilities: 
 The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, . . . is not that [he] shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done. . . . He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not 
at liberty to strike foul ones.516
As one court explained, this “overriding obligation of fairness [is] so 
important that the Anglo-American criminal law rests on the foundation: 
better the guilty escape than the innocent suffer.”517 
Absolute prosecutorial immunity undermines this compelling 
obligation to protect the innocent and to see that justice shall be done. 
We are not concerned here with minor breaches of professional etiquette. 
Prosecutors who engage in misconduct strike not just hard blows, but 
criminal blows. Specifically, when a prosecutor violates a person’s due 
process rights, the violation is a crime.518 Subornation of perjury is a 
crime.519 Tampering with and coercing witnesses is a crime.520 Using 
false evidence before a grand jury or court is a crime.521 Yet the 
prosecutors who engage in this criminal conduct are not prosecuted, are 
not disciplined, and are not held liable for their crimes.522
Given this reality, how can we have faith in our criminal justice 
system? How can we ask or expect those most vulnerable to the misuse 
of the criminal process—the poor, racial and ethnic minorities—to trust 
the integrity of the criminal justice process? The ABA’s Kennedy 
 515. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940). 
 516. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 517. Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1957). 
 518. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2004). 
 519. Id. § 1622. 
 520. Id. § 1512. 
 521. Id. § 1623. 
 522. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. 
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Commission has just released a report flagging the existence of 
widespread racial and ethnic discrimination in the criminal justice 
system.523 One recent commentator explored the nexus between poverty, 
race, and wrongful convictions.524 In addition to the accidental events 
that lead to the wrongful convictions of minorities, including faulty 
eyewitness testimony in cross-racial identification,525 poverty itself is a 
factor contributing to wrongful convictions.526 When prosecutorial 
misconduct is added to this mix, the risk of wrongful conviction 
escalates.527 According to one study, fifty-seven percent of the 
wrongfully convicted who have been exonerated were African-
American.528
The justification for absolute immunity is that civil rights litigation 
will chill the prosecutorial function and unduly burden the government. 
But the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in wrongful 
convictions529 suggests that we have sacrificed the integrity of our 
criminal justice system for the sake of efficiency. This corruption of our 
criminal justice system violates public policy. On the other hand, the 
elimination of absolute immunity would serve public policy. As Justice 
White wrote, “one would expect that the judicial process would be 
protected and indeed its integrity enhanced by denial of immunity to 
prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct.”530 Prosecutors 
must obey their solemn obligation to see that justice is done. To insure 
the integrity of our system of justice, those who violate their duty by 
trampling on clearly established constitutional rights must be held 
accountable. 
 523. ABA Urges Reform of Criminal Punishment in Response to Justice Kennedy’s Invitation, 
U.S. L. WK., Aug. 17, 2004, at 2092, 2093. 
 524. See Arthur L. Rizer, III, Justice in a Changed World: The Race Effect on Wrongful 
Convictions, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845 (2003). 
 525. Id. at 853–55; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2 at 264. 
 526. Rizer, supra note 524, at 856–60. 
 527. Id. at 861–64. 
 528. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2 at 267. 
 529. Id. app. 2 at 263 (finding prosecutorial misconduct a factor in the wrongful conviction of 
innocent people in twenty-six percent of the cases in which they were later exonerated by DNA 
evidence); HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i (finding prosecutorial misconduct led to the 
conviction of thirty-two innocent defendants and the reversal on appeal of more that 2000 cases 
tainted by prosecutorial misconduct over a thirty year period); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, 
Jan. 10, 1999 (finding that since 1963, 381 homicide convictions had been reversed nationwide due 
to prosecutorial misconduct). 
 530. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
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2. Absolute immunity denies victims a remedy 
The purpose of § 1983 is to provide victims of government 
misconduct a remedy.531 The Supreme Court has explained that the 
central purpose of the statute is to “give a remedy to parties deprived of 
constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of 
his position.”532 Absolute immunity defeats that purpose. As Justice 
White explained, extending “absolute immunity to any group of state 
officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it appears 
Congress sought to create.”533 The Court has recognized that absolute 
immunity leaves victims uncompensated and justice unfulfilled. As the 
Imbler Court stated, “[T]his immunity does leave the genuinely wronged 
defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or 
dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”534
The enormity of the constitutional injury cries out for a remedy. 
Innocent people have had their lives ruined by deliberate and egregious 
prosecutorial misconduct. Consider the innocent people who have spent 
years in prisons, many on death row, for crimes they did not commit. 
Consider Thomas Lee Goldstein, who spent twenty-four years in 
prison;535 John Tennison, who spent thirteen years in prison;536 Ellen 
 531. Scholars have proposed a number of other possible remedial schemes for compensating 
the wrongfully convicted. See Shawn Armbrust, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic 
Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2004) (proposing a remedial 
scheme that would address not only financial difficulties, but also health problems, lack of 
education, and job training); Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts To 
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. 
REV. 703 (2004) (proposing that state legislatures should adopt responsible compensation statutes 
and that courts should entertain civil rights suits); Alberto V. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A 
Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665 (2002) (proposing a 
model state statute to award the wrongfully convicted money damages for economic and 
noneconomic injuries). 
 532. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). (Note that the Court used the parallel citation, 
R.S § 1979; today the conventional reference to the statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.) The compensation 
justification for constitutional tort actions has been criticized on the ground that it leads courts to 
narrowly interpret constitutional rights in order to prevent financial burdens on the government. 
Jeffries, supra note 151, at 89–90. But Dean Jeffries recognizes that when qualified immunity 
applies—which is what this Article proposes for prosecutorial immunity—this risk is minimized. 
Indeed, in his view, qualified immunity promotes the development of constitutional law. Id. at 108–
09. 
 533. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 434 (White, J., concurring). 
 534. Id. at 427. 
 535. Judge Dismisses Murder Case, Frees Man After 24 Years, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2004, at 
B2. 
 536. Bob Egelko, Wrongfully Convicted of Murder, Man Sues, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 28, 2004, at 
B4. 
2JOH-FIN 5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM 
53] Prosecutorial Immunity 
 123 
 
Reasonover, who spent sixteen years in prison;537 or any of the hundreds 
of other innocent people who have been wrongfully convicted because of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
In our legal system, intentional wrongdoers are held civilly liable to 
those they injure. As one judge explained, “Privileges and immunities 
against responsibility are an anathema for a democratic society and most 
appropriately correctable by civil damage responsibility.”538
3. Absolute immunity allows misconduct that is unchecked by other 
mechanisms 
In addition to compensating victims, § 1983 liability serves as a 
deterrent to government misconduct. According to Justice White, “It 
should hardly need stating that, ordinarily, liability in damages for 
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect 
of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was precisely the proposition 
upon which § 1983 was enacted.”539 Absolute immunity frustrates this 
deterrent effect. 
The Court concluded that the deterrence provided by § 1983 is not 
necessary in the case of prosecutorial misconduct because of the other 
numerous checks on abusive misconduct.540 The Court relied on the trial 
judge, appellate review, collateral proceedings, potential criminal 
liability of prosecutors, and potential disciplinary proceedings against 
prosecutors in order to conclude that prosecutorial misconduct would be 
deterred by other means.541 In theory perhaps that is true, but in fact it is 
not. As explained in Part II of this Article, extensive research establishes 
 537. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 13. 
 538. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1302 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting), 
vacated by 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). 
 539. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442 (White, J., concurring); see, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980). The deterrent effect of monetary awards has been challenged by Professor 
Daryl J. Levinson. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). In his view, the deterrent effect of 
money damages actions is limited because governments do not respond to monetary liability in the 
same way that private actors do. Id. at 355–57. While private actors seek to maximize financial gain 
and will therefore adjust their behavior in response to financial costs, government institutions 
respond to political costs and benefits. Id. at 359. Since the political effects of constitutional tort 
actions are unpredictable, their deterrent effects are uncertain. Id. at 379–80. But see Myriam E. 
Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort 
Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001) (arguing that constitutional tort actions are an effective 
deterrent to government misconduct). 
 540. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–29. 
 541. Id. 
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that these mechanisms are grossly inadequate, and that misconduct 
occurs frequently, undeterred, and unpunished. 
Scholars have proposed a number of potential solutions to the 
problem.542 But Congress has already adopted one—§ 1983, the 
predominant civil rights remedy. The absolute immunity doctrine 
frustrates the deterrent purpose of the statute. 
4. Absolute immunity hinders the development of constitutional law and 
the implementation of structural remedies to systemic problems 
Civil rights litigation under § 1983 serves several important purposes 
in addition to providing a remedy and deterring misconduct.543 Civil 
rights litigation gives concrete meaning to abstract constitutional 
language.544 Moreover, as many scholars have explained, remedies 
influence rights.545 Since Monroe v. Pape was announced in 1961, § 
1983 has been a primary vehicle for the evolution of constitutional 
rights.546 Through this litigation, courts have defined the rights that 
protect people from government misconduct and regulate the discretion 
of officials to inflict injury.547 Dean John C. Jeffries explains that “the 
capacity of constitutional doctrine to adapt to evolving economic, 
political, and social conditions is a great strength.”548
This evolution of constitutional doctrine is fostered under a qualified 
immunity regime. The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to 
determine whether the alleged wrongdoing, in fact, violated the 
 542. See, e.g., Meares, supra note 123, at 899; Steele, Jr., supra note 123, at 982–88; Rick A. 
Bierschbach, Note, One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of Convictions Tainted by Prosecutorial 
Misconduct and the Ban on Double Jeopardy, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1346 (1996); Douglas P. Currier, 
Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers To Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment—A Basis for 
Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (1984); Carrissa Hessich, Note, 
Prosecutorial Subornation of Perjury: Is the Fair Justice Agency the Solution We Have Been 
Looking For?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 2545 (2002); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for 
Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083 
(1994). 
 543. Park, supra note 151, at 395–96. 
 544. See id. at 420. 
 545. Id. at 420–22; see also Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 1 (1979); John C. Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000); Daryl 
J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
 546. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see supra text accompanying notes 146–49. 
 547. Park, supra note 151, at 422–24. 
 548. Jeffries, supra note 151, at 97. 
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Constitution.549 This requirement ensures the development of 
constitutional doctrine and the evolution of appropriate standards and 
constitutional norms for official conduct.550 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
explained: “Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the 
qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in legal standards for 
official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general 
public.”551
While qualified immunity permits the development of law, it does 
not expose the government to excessive liability because it protects the 
defendant from liability unless the law was clearly established and a 
reasonable officer would have known of that law.552 In other words, if 
courts announce a new constitutional rule, they will only impose liability 
for future violations,553 which officers can avoid by complying with the 
newly established law. This approach, according to Dean Jeffries, allows 
courts to announce innovations in the evolution of constitutional law 
without “fear of subjecting the government to excessive costs.”554
In addition to fostering the continuing evolution of constitutional 
doctrine, individual civil rights actions bring about structural reforms to 
systemic problems.555 In some cases, these actions result in broad 
injunctive relief regulating government conduct. School desegregation 
and prison reform cases are notable examples.556 For example, while the 
Court avoids undue involvement in prison administration, it has 
recognized that the Eighth Amendment provides fundamental 
constitutional protections including an obligation to provide medical care 
to sick and injured prisoners.557 Where prisons fall below the 
constitutional minimum, injunctive relief is available to ensure humane 
treatment is provided.558
 549. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 n.5 (1998); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). 
 550. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1998); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 n.5. 
 551. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. 
 552. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 n.5. 
 553. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614–18. 
 554. Jeffries, supra note 151, at 89–90. 
 555. Park, supra note 151, at 440–42. 
 556. See id. at 445–47. 
 557. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also Park, supra note 152, at 428–29. 
 558. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that systemic 
deficiencies in a prison medical program can be remedied by injunctive relief and deferring an order 
to close the facility on the condition that the state would present a plan for eradicating the 
constitutional deficiencies); Morales Feliciano v. Rossello Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 210 
(D.P.R. 1998) (finding that the evidence established systemic deficiencies in staffing, facilities, 
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Even without injunctive relief, individual actions for money damages 
can set national standards. As Justice Blackmun explained in refuting the 
argument that individual prisoner cases unduly burden the federal courts, 
“I suspect that improvements in prison conditions of recent years are 
traceable in large part, and perhaps primarily, to actions under § 1983 
challenging those conditions.”559 For example, a recent Supreme Court 
decision held that restraining a prisoner by handcuffing him to a hitching 
post for up to seven hours in the hot sun violated the Eighth 
Amendment.560 While the plaintiff filed the case as an individual 
damage action, this decision sends a national message about the 
constitutional treatment of prisoners. Thus, individual damage actions 
serve to set constitutional standards and correct constitutional abuses at a 
national level. As one recent article concluded, “most of the rights 
regulating a government official’s discretion to inflict injury upon 
individuals have been established in constitutional tort actions.”561
Absolute immunity stymies the development of constitutional law 
since it requires courts to dismiss actions at the earliest stages without 
regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim.562 For this 
reason, it tends to freeze the law in a state of perpetual uncertainty. To 
the extent that the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct might be 
attributable to honest ignorance, qualified immunity should be adopted 
so that legal standards may be developed and enforced to protect 
constitutional rights. For example, in Kalina v. Fletcher, in which the 
Court refused to apply absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Court 
procedures, and administration of medical care caused by the deliberate indifference of officials to 
basic human and health needs of prisoners; continuing in force prior orders to ensure constitutional 
minimum standards are implemented); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1314 (E.D. Cal. 
1995) (finding that medical care for prisoners who suffer from serious mental disorders was so 
inadequate that their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated, and 
granting injunctive relief for the development and implementation of remedial plans). 
 559. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 21. 
 560. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 730 (2002). 
 561. Park, supra note 151, at 446. 
 562. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The plaintiff had been sterilized 
pursuant to a court order sought by her mother. Id. at 351–53. She was told she was having her 
appendix removed. Id. at 353. After she married and was unable to become pregnant, she discovered 
the truth. Id. She sued the judge who had granted the order on the grounds that his issuance of the 
order violated her constitutional rights. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of 
absolute immunity without considering the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Id. at 355–
64; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 279 (1993). In Buckley, the plaintiff alleged a 
violation of due process when the prosecutor had fabricated evidence in order to convict the plaintiff. 
Buckley, 259 U.S. at 262–63. The Court addressed the immunity defenses without resolving whether 
the misconduct violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 267–79. 
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condemned the custom of having the prosecutor swear to the facts 
supporting the arrest warrant, thereby setting a national standard for 
prosecutors and curtailing a practice jeopardizing constitutional 
protections.563 As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observed, “From a 
practical perspective, Kalina will mean that prosecutors no longer will 
file declarations in support of arrest warrants under penalty of 
perjury.”564 Had absolute immunity been applied, the issue would not 
have been addressed and, undoubtedly, the practice would have 
continued.  
In short, adopting a uniform rule of qualified immunity for 
prosecutors would promote the evolution of national standards for 
constitutional prosecutions, to the benefit of both prosecutors and the 
public. When qualified immunity applies, the courts first address the 
merits of the claim and determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct 
violated the Constitution. When violations are found, prosecutors reform 
their practices to avoid future liability. In this way, prosecutors will be 
guided on how to conform their practice to constitutional standards, and 
citizens will be protected from unconstitutional misconduct. 
5. Absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect honest prosecutors 
The Court held that absolute immunity was necessary to ensure that 
prosecutors are not chilled in the vigorous enforcement of the criminal 
law by the fear of subsequent civil liability.565 Those convicted of crimes 
should not be permitted to retaliate against their prosecutors and burden 
the court system with civil rights actions based on alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct.566 And, as the Court has observed, even the most honest 
prosecutor sometimes makes mistakes.567
But this fear of a flood of frivolous civil rights actions for 
prosecutorial misconduct is exaggerated for three main reasons. First, the 
requirements for imposing liability are sufficiently rigorous to eliminate 
unfounded and harassing litigation. Second, qualified immunity has 
become a potent defense that minimizes litigation burdens and protects 
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
 563. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 (1997). 
 564. Chemerinsky, supra note 191, at 81. 
 565. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976). 
 566. See id. at 423–24. 
 567. Id. at 425. 
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law.”568 Third, courts have efficient tools for minimizing or penalizing 
unmeritorious litigation. 
 
a. The elements required to state a § 1983 action will eliminate 
frivolous and vexatious litigation. The Court has explained that 
prosecutors need protection from wasteful litigation. To this end, the 
Court has interpreted § 1983 to impose barriers on potential litigants, 
requiring them to meet two difficult standards. Specifically, the plaintiff 
must show: (1) the criminal proceeding terminated in his or her favor; 
and (2) the prosecutor violated the Constitution with a culpable state of 
mind. This section will explain these elements. 
 
 (1) The plaintiff must prove the criminal prosecution terminated 
in his or her favor. In 1976, when the Court first adopted absolute 
prosecutorial immunity, it was not clear whether a plaintiff suing a 
prosecutor for misconduct had to establish that the criminal prosecution 
terminated in favor of the defendant.569 For this reason, the Court 
understandably feared that disgruntled convicts would retaliate by suing 
their prosecutors.570 But beginning in 1994 with the case of Heck v. 
Humphrey,571 the Court has required plaintiffs seeking to recover for 
wrongful convictions to establish that the criminal proceeding was 
resolved in their favor. This development greatly reduces the threat of 
unmeritorious, retaliatory litigation. 
In Heck, the plaintiff (Heck) was convicted of manslaughter and 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.572 While he was serving this 
sentence and while his direct appeal was pending, Heck filed a § 1983 
civil rights action naming county prosecutors and a state police 
investigator as defendants.573 The complaint alleged that the defendants 
conducted an illegal investigation of him, destroyed exculpatory 
evidence, and used an unlawful voice identification procedure against 
him at trial.574 He sought compensatory and punitive damages.575 The 
Court ruled that the action was not cognizable under § 1983.576
 568. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–95 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986)). 
 569. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 570. See id. at 423–25. 
 571. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
 572. Id. at 478. 
 573. Id. at 478–79. 
 574. Id. at 479. 
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The Court explained that § 1983 created a species of tort liability and 
that the most analogous common-law action was malicious 
prosecution.577 As an element of a malicious prosecution action, the 
plaintiff must allege and prove that the prior criminal proceeding 
terminated in favor of the accused.578 The Court imposed this 
requirement in the civil rights action for two primary reasons. First, it 
avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation with possibly inconsistent 
results.579 Second, it prevents a collateral attack on the conviction by 
means of a civil action.580 The Heck Court ruled that this requirement 
applies in any action to recover damages for an allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.581 Thus, to bring a §1983 
action, a plaintiff must prove that the challenged conviction or sentence 
has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 
invalid, or subject to a federal writ of habeas corpus.582 The Court 
concluded that the “hoary principle that civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal 
judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the 
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.”583
Thus, the Heck requirement that a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action 
must prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement largely 
eliminates the potential flood of frivolous litigation that concerned the 
Imbler Court.584
  
 (2) The plaintiff must prove that the prosecutor violated the 
Constitution with a culpable state of mind. Currently, requirements for 
recovery under § 1983 for malicious prosecution are undefined.585 As 
 575. Id. 
 576. Id. at 487. 
 577. Id. at 483–84. 
 578. Id. at 484. 
 579. Id. 
 580. Id. 
 581. Id. at 486–87. 
 582. Id. 
 583. Id. at 486. 
 584. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1178–79. 
 585. As discussed above, the absolute immunity doctrine stymies the development of civil 
rights law by resolving actions based on the immunity defense and avoiding an analysis of the merits 
of the constitutional claim. See supra notes 543–64 and accompanying text; see also  Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994). In Albright, a majority of the Court (in five separate opinions) 
held that malicious prosecution actions under § 1983 should be analyzed based on the explicit text of 
the Constitution, not based on common-law tort or substantive due process. See id. at 273–75; id. at 
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the Court has noted, “the extent to which a claim of malicious 
prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one ‘on which there is an 
embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion.’”586 But two points are 
relatively clear: (1) the plaintiff must prove a violation of constitutional 
law; and (2) the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with a culpable 
state of mind. 
In developing the requirements for § 1983 liability, the Court has 
consistently looked to analogous common-law principles.587 However, 
“[a]lthough the common law tort serves as an important guidepost for 
defining the constitutional cause of action, the ultimate question is 
always whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation.”588 
Thus, to establish liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983, the 
plaintiff must show a violation of constitutional law, not simply a 
common-law tort cause of action.589
275–91 (opinions of Scalia, Ginsberg, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., concurring). The Albright decision 
generated a fair amount of uncertainty, which remains unresolved, about the viability of an action 
under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. See BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 149, at 31–35; John T. 
Ryan, Malicious Prosecution Claims Under Section 1983: Do Citizens Have Federal Recourse?, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 776 (1996); Schillaci, supra note 140, at 439; Mary E. Williams, Constitutional 
Law—Constitutional Remedy? The Third Circuit’s Approach to §1983 Malicious Prosecution 
Claims, 44 VILL. L. REV. 919 (1999); Joseph G. Yannetti, Who’s on First, What’s on Second, and I 
Don’t Know About the Sixth Circuit: A § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Circuit Split That Would 
Confuse Even Abbott and Costello, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 513 (2003); Esther M. Schonfeld, Note, 
Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort: Continued Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 TOURO 
L. REV. 1681 (1999). 
 586. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4; see also Ryan, supra note 585, at 776; Schillaci, supra note 
140, at 439; Williams, supra note 585, at 919; Yannetti, supra note 585, at 517; Schonfeld, supra 
note 585, at 1681. 
 587. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–86 (looking to the common law tort of malicious prosecution); 
see also Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1288–90 (10th Cir. 2004); Lambert v. Williams, 223 
F.3d 257, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 588. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1289 (citing Taylor v. Meachum, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 
1996)). 
 589. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4; see also Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1289; Penn v. Harris, 296 
F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires 
a constitutional violation); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 379–83 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a 
malicious prosecution action should be analyzed under the relevant constitutional provision); 
Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that malicious prosecution 
claims under § 1983 should be analyzed under the language of the Constitution itself); Lambert v. 
Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2000); Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1055 
(8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires a 
constitutional violation); Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 1999); Torres v. 
McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1998); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 
1996); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995); Torres v. Superintendent of 
Police, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1990); Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174–75 (6th Cir. 
1987); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561–62 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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To establish the constitutional violation, the plaintiff must satisfy the 
state-of-mind requirement imposed by the Court. In developing the 
elements of constitutional claims, the Court has frequently used state-of-
mind requirements to keep liability within appropriate bounds. For 
example, in prison discipline cases claiming a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted maliciously and 
sadistically.590 On the other hand, in prison medical cases alleging an 
Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.591 In 
substantive due process cases, the Court imposes the shocking-to-the-
conscience requirement, which depends on the factual context.592 In 
procedural due process cases, the Court requires a culpable state of mind 
beyond mere negligence.593 By imposing these state-of-mind 
requirements, the Court strikes a balance between the competing interests 
of protecting the functioning of the government and the civil rights of 
individuals.594
While the Court has yet to establish the state-of-mind requirement 
for § 1983 actions against prosecutors, a related decision suggests that 
the Court will impose a significant subjective state-of-mind requirement. 
Specifically, in Heck, the plaintiff alleged that he had been wrongly 
convicted because a police investigator destroyed exculpatory evidence 
and introduced false evidence at trial.595 To determine whether the 
complaint was cognizable, the Court turned to the most analogous 
common-law tort, malicious prosecution. The Court held that no action 
would lie unless the criminal proceeding had been terminated in favor of 
the accused since that was an element of malicious prosecution.596 If the 
Court adopts this same analogy for the state-of-mind element for § 1983 
 590. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–22 (1986) (adopting a malicious and sadistic 
standard to avoid undue intrusion on prison operations). 
 591. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–06 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
was violated when prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). 
 592. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–55 (1998) (holding that in cases 
involving high-speed chases, the police are not liable unless their conduct was shocking to the 
conscience, which in the factual context required a showing of intent). 
 593. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that to establish a due process 
violation, the plaintiff must show a culpable state of mind beyond mere negligence); see also 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
 594. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845–55. 
 595. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. 
 596. Id. at 484. 
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prosecutorial misconduct cases, plaintiffs will be required to prove that 
prosecutors acted with malice since that is an element of the common-
law tort.597
In short, while the precise requirements for recovery for 
prosecutorial misconduct remain unresolved, it is clear that the plaintiff 
will be required to establish a constitutional violation, not simply a tort 
cause of action.598 Moreover, the Court will undoubtedly impose a 
culpable state-of-mind standard sufficient to protect government 
functions and the discretion of the prosecutor. By analogizing to the 
common-law tort of malicious prosecution, the Court may well require 
the plaintiff to prove that the prosecutor acted with malice.599 Or the 
Court may adopt the due process requirement that the conduct be 
shocking to the conscience.600 But clearly the Court will follow its prior 
decisions in adopting a state-of-mind requirement sufficient to protect 
the government function. Because the constitutional cause of action 
imposes these substantial proof requirements, the risk of unfounded 
litigation is greatly reduced. 
 
b. The defense of qualified immunity has evolved to insure that 
frivolous actions are eliminated at the earliest stages of litigation. In 
addition to the difficulty of establishing the elements of the cause of 
action, plaintiffs will also have to overcome the potent defense of 
qualified immunity. Initially, when absolute prosecutorial immunity was 
first adopted,601 qualified immunity was based on the good faith and 
reasonableness of the defendant.602 Today, the Court has revised this 
defense to impose a purely objective standard.603 The current doctrine 
affords much greater protection to defendants and minimizes the risk that 
vexatious litigation will advance beyond its earliest stages. 
 597. Malice is an element of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution. See Schonfeld, 
supra note 585, at 1704; see also Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297 n.12 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that neither party questioned the malice standard in a § 1983 malicious prosecution case but 
also noting that the applicable standard had yet to be determined); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 433, at 1223–25 (2000). 
 598. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). 
 599. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–86 (looking to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution). 
 600. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998). 
 601. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). 
 602. Id. 
 603. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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The current qualified immunity doctrine is far more protective than 
when Imbler was decided.604 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald the Court 
“completely reformulated qualified immunity,” replacing the subjective 
standard with an objective standard based on clearly established law.605 
The Court candidly explained that the subjective standard was 
incompatible with the need to eliminate the burdens of discovery and 
litigation.606 Under the Harlow standard, an officer is liable only when 
she violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”607 The change was 
designed to avoid disruption of the government and permit the resolution 
of weak claims on summary judgment.608 The application of qualified 
immunity to most government officials reflects the Court’s view that a 
balance should be struck between vindicating the rights of citizens and 
protecting government officials exercising their discretion.609 The Court 
has found that, “[i]n most cases, qualified immunity is sufficient to 
‘protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official 
authority.’”610 As Justice White explained, changing qualified immunity 
to an objective standard “satisfies one of the principal concerns 
underlying our recognition of absolute immunity.”611 In other words, one 
of the main justifications for adopting absolute immunity no longer 
exists. 
In addition to transforming qualified immunity from a subjective to 
an objective standard, the Court has adopted a series of practical, 
procedural safeguards to insure that the qualified immunity defense can 
be resolved at the earliest stages of litigation. The Court has explained 
that qualified immunity is intended to protect officers not just from the 
burden of liability but also from the burden of litigation.612 When the 
defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, discovery on other 
issues is stayed until the issue is resolved by motion to dismiss or motion 
 604. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–95 (1991). 
 605. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). 
 606. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16. 
 607. Id. at 818. 
 608. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 n.8; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 609. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
 610. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 
478, 506 (1978)). 
 611. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 n.8. 
 612. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814–18; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
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for summary judgment.613 Additionally, a defendant is entitled to an 
immediate interlocutory appeal if the trial court rejects the immunity 
defense.614 Thus, qualified immunity affords defendants an effective 
means of avoiding unnecessary litigation so that the extraordinary 
protection of absolute immunity is no longer necessary.615 As Justice 
White observed, the current qualified immunity defense “provides ample 
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”616
Since qualified immunity is now a potent defense, it is sufficient to 
protect the criminal justice system from undue disruption.617 One court 
observed: 
 Since Imbler, the Court has expanded the protection of qualified 
immunity . . . . Thus, § 1983 defendants who have qualified immunity 
are now less likely to be liable, and, if not liable, are less likely to have 
to go to trial since the objective qualified immunity standard lends itself 
to resolution on the pleadings. This decreases the disruption to state 
criminal law enforcement that would result from granting a prosecutor 
only qualified immunity.618
In short, just as the elements of the cause of action have evolved to 
eliminate the potential for wasteful litigation, the defense of qualified 
 613. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 614. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524–30. 
 615. See McNamara, supra note 123, at 1175–78; Weeks, supra note 123, at 877. 
 616. Burns, 500 U.S. at 494–95 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
 617. Qualified immunity is not without critics. For example, Professor Sheldon H. Nahmod 
devotes an entire section of his treatise to a critical analysis of qualified immunity. 2 NAHMOD, 
supra note 133, § 8:5. As he observes, there is no data to support the Court’s conclusion that 
qualified immunity is needed to protect government officials from undue burdens, and the Court did 
not consider the benefits to society of imposing liability for constitutional misconduct. Id. In his 
view, the Court has “limited individual liability by converting qualified immunity into the functional 
equivalent of absolute immunity.” Id.; see also Sheldon Nahmod, From the Courtroom to the Street: 
Court Orders and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 613, 641 n.125 (2002) (arguing that 
under qualified immunity “much harm caused by wrongful unconstitutional conduct remains 
unredressed”). But in my view this criticism is not accurate in the context of prosecutorial immunity 
since the conduct at issue typically violates clearly established law. Specifically, withholding 
exculpatory evidence violates Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Fabricating evidence and 
witness tampering are crimes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1512, 1622, 1623. Thus, under a qualified 
immunity rule, the prosecutors who engage in this misconduct would be liable for violating clearly 
established law of which a reasonable officer would have known. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 618. Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 n.2 (10th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted), quoted in 
McKenna, supra note 191, at 677 n.89. 
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immunity has evolved to efficiently eliminate unmeritorious claims.619 It 
affords ample protection to the honestly mistaken prosecutor. 
 
c. Courts have effective tools to control and dispose of frivolous and 
vexatious litigation. In addition to the liability requirements and the 
protection of qualified immunity, courts have effective procedural tools 
to control burdensome litigation. The Court highlighted these traditional 
devices when it refused to grant immunity to the President (for his 
conduct before taking office) in Clinton v. Jones.620 Though the 
President decried the potential for exposure to taxing litigation,621 the 
Court recognized that most frivolous lawsuits are disposed of at the 
pleading or summary judgment stage with little or no involvement by the 
actual defendant.622 Moreover, courts can sanction offending litigants.623 
These same tools—in addition to the other safeguards discussed above—
are available to protect prosecutors from meritless litigation. 
6. Absolute immunity introduces unnecessary complexity and confusion 
into the law 
The current absolute prosecutorial immunity defense is complicated 
and difficult to apply. As Part IV.B explains, it has generated confusion 
and conflict in the lower courts. Today, circuit courts are split on at least 
four distinct issues related to prosecutorial immunity.624 Moreover, as 
discussed above, recent decisions applying the immunity doctrine have 
introduced subjective state-of-mind questions that preclude rather than 
promote the early resolution of the litigation.625
The confusion and litigation generated by the absolute immunity 
doctrine might be acceptable if the doctrine were justified by substantive 
policy reasons. But it is not. As this discussion has shown, absolute 
prosecutorial immunity violates rather than serves public policy. 
Moreover, adopting qualified immunity in all cases against prosecutors 
would eliminate this unwarranted confusion by applying one uniform, 
objective standard. Qualified immunity properly balances the need to 
 619. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1177–78. 
 620. 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 621. Id. at 708–10. 
 622. Id. at 708. 
 623. Id. at 708–09. 
 624. See supra Part IV.B. 
 625. See supra notes 369–78, 399–412 and accompanying text. 
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protect government functions against the need to protect individual civil 
rights and provides an affirmative defense that can be efficiently used in 
the initial stages of the proceeding to eliminate not just the burden of 
liability but also the burden of litigation.626
C. Stare Decisis Does Not Justify the Continuance of Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity 
The doctrine of stare decisis rightly constrains the Court’s ability to 
overrule precedent and promotes the stability of and respect for the rule 
of law.627 But when the Court has adopted an erroneous rule of law that 
produces unjust and inconsistent results and has not induced detrimental 
reliance by individuals or society, the Court should and does reverse 
course and correct the error.628 In the case of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity, the Court should make this correction.629
While the Court has not been entirely consistent with respect to stare 
decisis,630 the Court has identified factors suggesting that a prior 
erroneous precedent should be overruled when: (1) the soundness of the 
original principle is doubtful;631 (2) the foundations of the principle have 
been eroded by subsequent decisions;632 (3) the principle has been 
divorced from its apparent original purpose by factual and legal 
changes;633 (4) the principle has generated a body of interpretative law 
that is so complex that the law has become difficult to apply;634 (5) the 
principle has been subject to substantial and consistent criticism;635 and 
 626. See supra notes 601–19 and accompanying text. 
 627. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1154. 
 628. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (holding that a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis is 
justified where a prior precedent has become “a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in 
the law”). 
 629. See McNamara, supra note 123, at 1159–92. 
 630. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 631. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 431, 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (1997) 
(citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–49 (1977) (reexamining an 
interpretation of the Sherman Act)); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 697–715 (1995) 
(reexamining an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
664–90 (1978) (reexamining an interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 632. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 633. Brown, 520 U.S. at 431, 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 697–
715; Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–90; Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 47–49). 
 634. Brown, 520 U.S. at 431, 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 697–
715; Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–90; Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 47–49). 
 635. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77. 
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(6) the principle has not induced individual and societal reliance that 
counsels against overruling.636 In the case of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity, all of these factors suggest that the doctrine should be 
overruled. 
First, as discussed above, the soundness of the doctrine of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity is doubtful.637 The Court initially adopted the 
doctrine based on the misconception that it reflected the common law in 
1871 and that it furthered public policy.638 However, absolute 
prosecutorial immunity was not available under the common law in 
1871.639 Moreover, absolute prosecutorial immunity violates public 
policy by undermining the integrity of the criminal justice process, by 
denying victims of misconduct a remedy, by failing to deter misconduct, 
and by frustrating the development of constitutional standards.640
Second, the foundations of absolute prosecutorial immunity have 
been eroded by subsequent decisions. As the Court explained, qualified 
immunity is usually sufficient to protect government functions and 
absolute immunity is only granted when the proponent has made a strong 
showing of a special need for extra protection.641 Since absolute 
prosecutorial immunity was first adopted in Imbler v. Pachtman,642 each 
subsequent Supreme Court decision interpreting the doctrine has 
narrowed its scope to prevent its application to conduct which is outside 
the prosecutor’s advocacy function. Specifically, in Burns v. Reed, the 
Court held that absolute immunity does not apply to the prosecutor’s 
conduct in giving legal advice to the police.643 In Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, the Court held that absolute immunity does not apply 
where the prosecutor conspires with police to fabricate evidence.644 And, 
 636. Id. 
 637. See supra Part V.A–B. 
 638. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420–29. 
 639. See supra Part V.A; see also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11. 
 640. See supra Part V.B. 
 641. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993). 
 642. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 643. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 496 (1991); see also James Lappan, The Prosecutor, The 
Investigator, The Administrator, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Burns v. Reed: The Hammer Has Dropped, 
62 MISS. L.J. 169, 190 (1992); A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying Immunity in Section 1983 and 
Bivens Actions, 71 TEX. L. REV. 123 (1992). 
 644. Buckley, 509 U.S. 259; see also Barrow, supra note 191; Thomas J. Foltz, Prosecutorial 
Immunity No Longer Absolute, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1994, at 21; Angelee J. Harris, Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons: The Supreme Court Limits Absolute Immunity Protection for Prosecutors, 20 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 212 (1994); Kenner, supra note 500, at 425–27 (arguing that Buckley improperly limits 
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finally, in Kalina v. Fletcher, the Court held that absolute immunity does 
not shield a prosecutor who makes false statements of fact in an affidavit 
supporting an application for an arrest warrant.645 Thus, while Imbler 
adopted a potentially expansive absolute immunity defense, in each of its 
subsequent decisions the Court has limited the doctrine. 
Third, factual and legal changes have divorced the principle of 
absolute immunity from its original purpose. The original purpose of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity was to safeguard the integrity of the 
criminal justice system and to protect honest prosecutors from the burden 
and distraction of harassing civil litigation.646 Rather than protecting the 
integrity of the criminal justice system, absolute prosecutorial immunity 
has undermined the integrity of the criminal justice system by preventing 
accountability and fostering unchecked prosecutorial misconduct, 
resulting in the wrongful convictions of hundreds of innocent people.647 
Subsequent developments have made absolute immunity unnecessary to 
protect the honest prosecutor from vexatious litigation. As explained 
above, Heck (requiring the plaintiff to prove the favorable termination of 
the criminal proceeding)648 and Harlow (transforming qualified 
immunity into an objective standard)649 have dramatically reduced, if not 
eliminated, the threat of a flood of frivolous litigation against the honest 
prosecutor.650 Since the threats that the doctrine was designed to prevent 
have been addressed by these related legal developments, this 
justification for maintaining absolute immunity no longer exists. 
Fourth, absolute prosecutorial immunity has generated a body of 
interpretative law so complex that it has become difficult to apply.651 An 
unworkable doctrine that creates confusion in the lower courts can 
become “a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the 
law.”652 A legal doctrine that requires a great many “distinctions to 
absolute prosecutorial immunity); Deborah S. Platz, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: The Beginning of the 
End for Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1919 (1994). 
 645. 522 U.S. at 130–31; see also Anne H. Burkett, Kalina v. Fletcher: Another Qualification 
of Imbler’s Prosecutorial Immunity Doctrine, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1999). 
 646. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–27. 
 647. See supra Parts II, V.B. 
 648. 512 U.S. at 486–87. 
 649. 457 U.S. at 818. 
 650. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1175–79. 
 651. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 431, 435 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989). 
 652. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173. 
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maintain its legal life may not deserve such longevity.”653 As explained 
above, absolute immunity has generated at least four circuit court splits 
on its application.654 Furthermore, the doctrine requires the lower courts 
to distinguish between pre- and post-probable cause conduct655 and then 
to further distinguish between investigatory and advocatory conduct.656 
Moreover, litigating these distinctions requires extensive discovery and 
generates intricate questions of fact that defeat the goal of immunity, 
which is to allow the early disposition of the litigation.657 The confusion 
and complexity of the doctrine suggests that it should be reconsidered. 
Fifth, members of the Court and the scholarly community have 
leveled substantial and consistent criticism at the doctrine of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity. Justice Scalia has repeatedly and persuasively 
demonstrated that the Court’s conclusion that absolute prosecutorial 
immunity existed under the common law in 1871 is simply wrong.658 
Scholars have criticized the Court’s prosecutorial immunity analysis and 
argued that qualified immunity for prosecutors is more in keeping with 
common-law immunities659 and better supported by policy.660 Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky has repeatedly pointed out the lower courts’ 
confusion about the doctrine.661 As he explained: “The distinction 
between investigative and prosecutorial tasks is inherently arbitrary. It is 
not surprising that in the last six years, there have been three Supreme 
Court decisions addressing it. Many more are likely to follow until the 
Court reconsiders the desirability of its approach to prosecutorial 
immunity.”662 Thus, while the circuit conflicts discussed in this paper 
 653. Brown, 520 U.S. at 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 654. See supra Part IV.B. 
 655. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993). 
 656. Id. at 274 n.5. 
 657. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
817–18 (1982). 
 658. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Buckley, 509 
U.S. at 279–80 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497–98 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 659. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. 
REV. 201, 256 (1980); Richard Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the 
Court’s Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 748 (1987); Filosa, supra note 416, at 980–81. 
 660. Feinman & Cohen, supra note 659, at 261–64; Filosa, supra note 416, at 982–86. 
 661. Chemerinsky, supra note 192, at 1652–56. 
 662. Chemerinsky, supra note 191, at 82. 
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have not previously been analyzed, scholars have consistently attacked 
the Imbler absolute immunity doctrine.663
Sixth, overruling absolute prosecutorial immunity will not upset any 
justifiable individual or societal reliance on the doctrine. As the Supreme 
Court has explained, “the mainstay of stare decisis.” is “the desirability 
that the law furnishes a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to 
enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward 
surprise.”664 People must have confidence that they can predict the legal 
consequences of their actions “to facilitate the planning of primary 
activity. . . . However, that confidence is threatened least by the 
announcement of a new remedial rule to effectuate well-established 
primary rules of behavior.”665 Under this principle, allowing a remedy 
for prosecutorial misconduct is not precluded by the doctrine of stare 
decisis. If qualified immunity were to apply rather than absolute 
immunity, prosecutors would still be immune unless their conduct 
violated clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would have 
known,666 that is, “well-established primary rules of behavior.”667
Moreover, as the cases discussed in this Article illustrate, the 
misconduct at issue does not involve grey areas of controversy over 
which reasonable minds might differ. The cases involve blatant and often 
criminal misconduct—manufacturing evidence, tampering with 
witnesses, suborning perjury. Certainly, prosecutors should not be 
allowed to claim that they violated clearly established law against such 
misconduct in reliance on the cloak of absolute immunity to shield them 
from liability. Qualified immunity provides sufficient protection to 
honest prosecutors exercising discretion in uncertain areas of the law; 
absolute immunity, on the other hand, protects those who deliberately 
violate the Constitution. Thus, overruling absolute immunity will not 
upset any legitimate expectations but will provide a needed remedy for 
willful violations of clearly established constitutional law. 
In short, stare decisis does not require continued adherence to the 
doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Rather, the Court should 
 663. See, e.g., McNamara, supra note 123; see also Filosa, supra note 416; Williams, supra 
note 3, at 3479–80. 
 664. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (recognizing a wrongful 
death cause of action for seaman killed aboard unseaworthy vessels); see also Monell v. Dep’t. of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 699–700 (1978). 
 665. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403. 
 666. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 667. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403. 
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reconsider the absolute immunity doctrine in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of persistent prosecutorial misconduct, the difficult 
requirements for establishing a § 1983 cause of action, and the high 
degree of protection afforded to prosecutors by the current qualified 
immunity defense.668
VI. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES WHERE 
THE PROSECUTOR HAS SUPPRESSED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OR HAS 
ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT BEFORE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY ATTACHED 
If courts decide that absolute immunity must persist in the § 1983 
framework, they should deny the doctrine’s application in two kinds of 
cases: (1) cases in which the prosecutor has suppressed exculpatory 
evidence; and (2) cases in which the prosecutor has engaged in 
misconduct before absolute immunity attached. As the following 
discussion will show, absolute immunity should not apply when a 
prosecutor has suppressed evidence because immunity in such cases is 
not necessary to protect the judicial process and is inconsistent with the 
Court’s functional approach to absolute immunity. Neither should 
absolute immunity apply to acts of misconduct during the investigative 
phase because such acts are only entitled to qualified immunity under the 
Court’s functional immunity doctrine. 
A. Absolute Immunity Should Not Apply when the Prosecutor Has 
Suppressed Exculpatory Evidence in Violation of Brady v. Maryland 
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland,669 the Supreme Court 
held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution.”670 Unfortunately, Brady violations are one of the 
most common forms—if not the most common form—of prosecutorial 
misconduct, yet discipline is rarely imposed.671 According to the 
 668. See McNamara, supra note 123, at 1137 (arguing that qualified immunity is sufficient 
protection); Williams, supra note 3, at 3479–80 (same). 
 669. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 670. Id. at 87. 
 671. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1850 (finding that sixteen percent of state post-conviction 
reversals in death penalty cases resulted from “prosecutorial suppression of evidence that the 
defendant is innocent or does not deserve the death penalty”); see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, 
app. 2 at 265 (noting that prosecutorial misconduct occurs in several forms: suppression of 
exculpatory evidence (forty-three percent); knowing use of false testimony (twenty-two percent); 
2JOH-FIN 5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
142 
 
Innocence Project, suppression of exculpatory evidence accounts for 
thirty-four percent of prosecutorial misconduct.672
The question of whether absolute immunity should be extended to 
prosecutors who withhold exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady has 
been debated by the Court since it first considered prosecutorial 
immunity in Imbler v. Pachtman.673 In fact, Imbler focused on the 
question of whether absolute or qualified immunity applied to a Brady 
violation. In Imbler, the majority stated that absolute immunity should 
apply.674
As the following discussion shows, the application of absolute 
immunity for Brady violations should be reconsidered for three reasons. 
First, it extends the doctrine beyond its proper scope since it is not 
necessary to protect the judicial system or the prosecutorial function. 
Second, it leaves unchecked prosecutorial misconduct that is unlikely to 
be addressed by the existing procedural safeguards. And, third, it is 
inconsistent with the Court’s functional approach to immunity defenses. 
As the Court has repeatedly stressed, absolute prosecutorial 
immunity should be confined to cases in which it is essential to the 
functioning of the judicial process or the prosecutorial function.675 But 
imposing liability for the suppression of exculpatory evidence poses no 
threat to the judicial process or to the prosecutorial function. Unlike the 
borderline judgment call a prosecutor may have to make about which 
witnesses to call when the testimony is conflicting, there is no danger of 
coerced witnesses (thirteen percent); improper closing argument (eight percent); false statements to 
the jury (eight percent); evidence fabrication (three percent); other misconduct (three percent)). 
Professor Richard Rosen wrote a detailed article cataloguing and classifying scores of instances in 
which prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by due process under Brady. 
Rosen, supra note 123, 697–703. Yet, despite the large number of Brady violations, he found only 
nine cases in which discipline of the prosecutor was even considered. See id. at 720–30. Of those 
nine, three resulted in no disciplinary action, four in minor sanctions, two in censures, one in 
suspension, and one in expulsion, which was later reversed. Id. at 728–30. A follow-up study found 
that in the decade after the first report there were seven additional cases in which discipline was 
sought for Brady violations. Weeks, supra note 123, at 881–82. In three, no discipline was imposed; 
in the other four, minor discipline was imposed. Id. 
 672. Innocence Project, supra note 1. 
 673. 424 U.S. 409. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in the 
decision because in their view the pleadings did not actually present the Brady question. Id. at 432–
33, 441, 447 (White, J., concurring). They concluded that the absolute immunity recognized by the 
majority was broader than that recognized at common law and broader than necessary to protect the 
judicial process. Id. at 441–43 (White, J., concurring). In their view, absolute immunity should not 
attach to Brady violations. Id. at 441–53 (White, J., concurring). 
 674. See supra Part IV.A. 
 675. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 437 (White, J., concurring). 
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introducing excessive caution into the process by imposing liability for 
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors should be 
cautious—very cautious—in deciding whether to disclose evidence. As 
the Supreme Court has explained, “‘where an official could be expected 
to know that his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, 
he should be made to hesitate.’”676
The prosecutor who fears liability on this ground can simply err on 
the side of caution and disclose more evidence than is actually required. 
Marginal evidence—viewed through the eyes of defense counsel—might 
be the key to unraveling the case and exonerating the accused. As Justice 
White explained, “A prosecutor seeking to protect himself from liability 
for failure to disclose evidence may be induced to disclose more than is 
required. But, this will hardly injure the judicial process. Indeed, it will 
help it.”677 In other words, in deciding whether to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence, prosecutors need not be chilled in the vigorous 
exercise of their discretion; they should simply be vigilant in complying 
with their Brady obligations. According to Justice White: 
 It is virtually impossible to identify any injury to the judicial process 
resulting from a rule permitting suits for such unconstitutional conduct, 
and it is very easy to identify an injury to the process resulting from a 
rule which does not permit such suits. Where the reason for the rule 
extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would truly 
be “monstrous to deny recovery.”678
In sum, imposing liability for suppression of exculpatory evidence poses 
no threat to the judicial process and indeed would have an entirely 
salutary effect.679
Moreover, unlike prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom, the 
safeguards intended to protect the innocent—the adversary process, the 
threat of criminal prosecution, and professional discipline—are not 
available to correct the suppression of evidence. Indeed, it is reasonable 
to assume that such violations rarely come to light. Since this conduct 
occurs outside of the judicial process, “the judicial process has no way to 
 676. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
819 (1982)). 
 677. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443 (White, J., concurring). 
 678. Id. at 444–45 (White, J., concurring). 
 679. Id. (White, J., concurring). 
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prevent or correct the constitutional violation of suppressing 
evidence.”680 As Justice White explained: 
The judicial process will by definition be ignorant of the violation when 
it occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never 
surface. It is all the more important, then, to deter such violations by 
permitting damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be maintained in 
instances where violations do surface.681
Finally, in terms of the Court’s functional approach to prosecutorial 
immunity, the prosecutor is not acting as an advocate in responding to a 
request to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady.682 As 
Professor Joseph R. Weeks pointed out, the duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence falls on the prosecutor because that office is the repository of 
the evidence gathered by the police:683 “Responding to such requests has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the prosecutor’s role as advocate of the 
state in determining such things as whether to prosecute, what charges to 
assert, what court to bring the case before, and what evidence is to be 
offered by the state at trial.”684 Thus, in the withholding of evidence, 
prosecutors are not performing an advocacy function and therefore 
should receive only qualified immunity. 
In other words, extending absolute immunity for Brady violations is 
incongruous with the functional approach to immunity. While the Court 
has never considered a § 1983 case in which a police officer was sued for 
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence that led to the plaintiff’s 
wrongful conviction, the lower courts have uniformly held such cases are 
actionable and subject only to qualified immunity.685 One of the Court’s 
“unquestioned goals of . . . § 1983 jurisprudence [is] ensuring parity in 
 680. Id. at 443 (White, J., concurring). 
 681. Id. at 443–44 (White, J., concurring). 
 682. Weeks, supra note 123, at 876. 
 683. Id. 
 684. Id. 
 685. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1299–1300 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that police 
chemist only entitled to qualified immunity for withholding exculpatory evidence); Newsome v. 
McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 303–04 (7th Cir. 2003); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 
1992); Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1989); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 
F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988); Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers 
Under Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1–
2, 47–49 (2003). According to Professor Avery, research discloses no cases in which the lower 
courts have not held that a police officer may be held liable under § 1983 where the suppression of 
evidence results in a wrongful conviction and incarceration. Id. at 29–30 nn.176–77. 
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treatment among state actors engaged in identical functions.”686 As the 
Court explained in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, when prosecutors and police 
engage in the same act of misconduct, “it is ‘neither appropriate nor 
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not 
the other.’”687 Where prosecutors and police engage in the same 
misconduct—suppression of exculpatory evidence—they should both 
receive qualified immunity.688
In short, absolute immunity for Brady violations should be 
reconsidered. Its application is unwarranted by the policies underlying 
the doctrine and fosters prosecutorial misconduct that is unlikely to be 
checked by existing procedural safeguards. Finally, it is inconsistent with 
the functional approach to immunity defenses for prosecutors to enjoy 
absolute immunity for suppressing evidence while police officers only 
enjoy qualified immunity for the same misconduct. 
B. Absolute Immunity Should Not Apply To Shield a Prosecutor  
from Liability for Prior Acts of Misconduct That Occurred  
Before Absolute Immunity Attached 
As discussed in Part IV.B above, confusion has arisen among lower 
courts about how the immunity doctrines apply when a prosecutor has 
fabricated evidence or tampered with witnesses and then introduced that 
corrupted evidence in a judicial proceeding.689 This confusion is an 
understandable consequence of the uncertainties surrounding the 
immunity doctrines. But, in this instance, the Court has given some 
guidance in two decisions, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.690 and Kalina v. 
Fletcher,691 which suggest that prosecutors who fabricate evidence 
should receive qualified, not absolute, immunity. 
 686. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 288 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1987); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 
U.S. 193, 201(1985)). 
 687. Id. at 273 (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
 688. See id.; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (holding that when prosecutor performs 
same function as police officer in swearing to facts to support a warrant, qualified immunity 
applies). 
 689. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28, 317–38; Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 
118 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that absolute immunity applies to introduction of tainted evidence); 
Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that qualified immunity applies to 
fabrication of evidence). 
 690. 509 U.S. at 259. 
 691. 522 U.S. at 118. 
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In Buckley, the prosecutor conspired with police to fabricate false 
evidence by retaining an unreliable anthropology expert to connect a 
boot print to the accused’s boot.692 The defendant spent ten months in 
jail awaiting trial.693 The expert testimony was the principal evidence 
used against him at trial.694 When the jury was unable to convict, he 
spent another two years in jail awaiting a retrial.695 The charges were 
ultimately dismissed after the expert died.696
The Court held that the fabrication of evidence during the 
investigative phase would not be protected by absolute immunity, even 
though the evidence was later used in the trial.697 With respect to the 
fabrication of evidence, the Court found that “there is no common-law 
tradition of immunity for it, whether performed by a police officer or 
prosecutor.”698 And the Court emphatically rejected the contention that a 
prosecutor may shield his investigative misconduct by presenting 
fabricated evidence to a grand jury or introducing it at trial because 
“every prosecutor might then shield himself from liability for any 
constitutional wrong against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to 
trial.”699 Thus, Buckley supports the proposition that a prosecutor who 
manufactures evidence during the investigative phase cannot bootstrap 
the immunity defense from qualified to absolute by introducing that 
evidence in court. 
Kalina supports the same conclusion.700 There the prosecutor 
manufactured evidence by swearing to false statements of fact to support 
an application for an arrest warrant.701 The Court rejected her claim for 
absolute immunity, holding she was not acting as an advocate in 
testifying as to the facts supporting the application because “[t]estifying 
about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.”702 Thus, 
under Kalina, a prosecutor who creates false evidence and then submits it 
to a court is not entitled to absolute immunity. 
 692. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 262–63; see also supra Part IV.A.3. 
 693. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 264. 
 694. Id. 
 695. Id. 
 696. Id. 
 697. Id. at 274–76. 
 698. Id. at 274 n.5. 
 699. Id. at 276. 
 700. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 118; see supra Part IV.A.4. 
 701. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 121.  
 702. Id. at 130. 
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The reason that these two cases fail to neatly resolve the issue is that 
the Court focused on different factors in reaching its conclusions in 
Buckley and Kalina. In Buckley, the Court focused on the chronology of 
the case. It concluded that since the boot print evidence was evaluated 
before probable cause was established, the prosecutor was necessarily 
acting as an investigator, not as an advocate.703 In Kalina, the Court 
focused on the fact that the prosecutor was acting as the complaining 
witness, and not as an advocate.704
These cases reveal the unsatisfactory nature of the current functional 
approach. A hypothetical example illustrates the problem. Assume a 
defendant had been arrested after a judicial finding of probable cause. 
The prosecutor then bribed a witness to sign an affidavit of false facts 
and introduced that affidavit into evidence. The Buckley case would not 
resolve the question because the misconduct occurred after probable 
cause was established. Arguably, under Buckley, the hypothetical 
prosecutor was acting as an advocate because the misconduct occurred 
after the establishment of probable cause.705 And the Kalina case would 
not solve the question because the prosecutor did not sign the false 
affidavit as a witness. Under Kalina, she was arguably acting as an 
advocate because she prepared a document for the purpose of submitting 
evidence in the judicial proceeding.706 If she were acting as an advocate 
under Buckley and Kalina, she would be entitled to absolute immunity. 
But this result seems entirely at odds with the outcome in both decisions. 
 A better approach would treat all cases of evidence fabrication 
identically. Rather than considering whether probable cause has been 
established (the Buckley approach), or whether the prosecutor is acting as 
a witness (the Kalina approach), courts should consider the nature of the 
misconduct: manufacturing false evidence. It is the same offense in each 
case and should be treated the same in each case. Manufacturing false 
evidence is neither an investigative function nor an advocacy function; it 
is a crime.707 It is equally wrong whether it occurs early or late in the 
case. It is equally wrong if the prosecutor swears to the false evidence 
herself or has a third party swear to it. As the Buckley Court held, there is 
no common-law tradition protecting this misconduct.708 If the prosecutor 
 703. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274–76. 
 704. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130–31. 
 705. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. 
 706. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129. 
 707. 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1512, 1623 (2004). 
 708. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274–75. 
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compounds the problem by persisting in the misconduct by both 
preparing the false evidence and then introducing it, the subsequent 
additional misconduct should not redound to the prosecutor’s benefit by 
effectively extending absolute immunity beyond the judicial phase of the 
proceedings.709
Moreover, as with cases involving the suppression of exculpatory 
evidence, under the functional approach prosecutors and police officers 
should receive the same immunity for the same misconduct. Under 
existing case law, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for 
fabricating evidence.710 The prosecutor should receive no greater 
protection.711 It is inconsistent and incongruous to afford prosecutors 
absolute immunity for the same conduct for which police officers receive 
only qualified immunity.712
If absolute immunity is retained at all, it should not be extended to 
out-of-court evidence fabrication, but rather should be confined to the 
narrowly defined judicial phase of the prosecution for several reasons. 
First, a narrow application of absolute immunity is consistent with the 
historical common-law immunities on which the Court relies as the 
starting point for immunity analysis.713 Second, a narrow application 
assures that the safeguards on which the Court relies to protect the 
accused—defense counsel, court supervision, appellate review714—will 
in fact be available.715 Third, it strikes the proper balance between 
protecting the prosecutor and the accused.716 Fourth, it provides the same 
immunity to prosecutors and police who engage in the same 
misconduct.717 Finally, it eliminates some measure of the unnecessary 
confusion complicating this area of the law.718
 709. See supra Part IV.B.2; Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 352–54 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(discussing whether the subsequent use of tainted evidence breaks the chain of proximate causation). 
 710. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying qualified immunity 
where a police forensic chemist fabricated inculpatory evidence); Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 
1030–31 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying qualified immunity where an FBI agent induced a jailhouse 
informant to fabricate a story); Spurlock v. Satterfeld, 167 F.3d 995, 1006–07 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(applying qualified immunity where an officer induced a jailhouse informant to create a false 
statement). 
 711. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. 
 712. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997). 
 713. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69. 
 714. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). 
 715. See id. at 443 (White, J., concurring). 
 716. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982). 
 717. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. 
 718. See supra Part V.B.6.  
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Absolute prosecutorial immunity should be reconsidered. Empirical 
studies establish that prosecutorial misconduct is a significant factor 
leading to the wrongful conviction of many innocent people.719 The 
supposed checks on prosecutorial misconduct fail to deter or punish 
misconduct or to protect the wrongfully accused.720 Civil liability will 
provide a needed check on misconduct and a needed remedy to the 
victim. Qualified immunity provides sufficient protection to the honest 
prosecutor while permitting the development of constitutional doctrine, 
the evolution of enforceable professional norms, and the implementation 
of needed remedies.721 Ultimately, prosecutorial accountability for 
constitutional misconduct will enhance the integrity of the criminal 
justice system.722
 
 719. See supra Part II. 
 720. See supra Part II. 
 721. See supra Part V.B. 
 722. See supra Part V.B. 
